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Abstract 
 
 
While people all over the world are vulnerable to natural disasters, the available data 
clearly demonstrate a great deal of cross-country variance in the impact of catastrophic 
events.  For example, while Hurricane Mitch took an estimated 13,000 lives when it 
struck Honduras and Nicaragua, the stronger Hurricane Andrew took only 26 lives when 
it impacted the United States.  What factors explain this difference?  Thus far, disaster 
researchers have emphasized economic and social vulnerability as determinants of 
disaster impact; the conventional wisdom accepts that poor and underdeveloped countries 
are more vulnerable than wealthy, developed countries.  I argue that the political 
institutions of a country also matter and then examine the relative importance of political 
vulnerability as a determinant of disaster impact.  I present evidence from case studies 
and large-N statistical analysis that demonstrates that, like social and economic 
vulnerability, political vulnerability is an important determinant of the impact of a natural 
disaster.         
 
 iv 
  
Table of Contents  
 
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………    2 
CHAPTER 1………………………………………………………………….………   12 
 Disasters and Disaster Relief:  Lessons from the field 
 A Sociological Perspective on Disasters 
 International Development Policy and Disasters 
 The Political Context of Disasters 
 International Strategy for Disaster Reduction: A framework for analysis 
 Public Service Provision and Political Institutions 
 A Summary and Three Hypothesis 
CHAPTER 2………………………………………………………………….………  36 
 Earthquakes around the world: Mexico, Japan, Turkey, India, and Algeria 
 Mozambique, Bangladesh, Germany: Massive Flooding 
 Nicaragua and Honduras:  As democracy increases, disaster impact decreases 
 Sample Selection Rules and A Sample of Nine Countries 
CHAPTER 3….………………………………………………………………………  57 
 A Model of Disaster, Disaster Response, and Disaster Impact 
 EM-DAT:  The International Disasters Database 
 Operationalization of the political variables 
 Operationalization of the control variables 
 v 
 vi 
 Regression Results 
 Testing the three hypotheses 
 Conclusion 
CHAPTER 4…………………………………………………………………………  73 
 Summary of Findings 
 Assessment of Results 
 Implications 
APPENDIXES 
 The EM-DAT dataset and some basic stats on disasters 
 Validity of research design assumption   
The regression analysis        
Using the regressions results to predict disaster impact 
WORKS CITED  
VITA   
 
 
 
 1 
Forces of nature trigger disaster events, but can no longer be considered the main causes 
of disasters themselves.  What other causes are there? 
   
   Anders Wijkman and Lloyd Timberlake 
   Natural Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man 
  
We are responsible of the deaths and we need to take measures... (Earthquakes) happen 
all around the world ... but no country in the world loses as many people to quakes as 
Turkey. 
   Turkey’s Culture Minister Erkan Mumcu 
 
[Many nations] cannot supply… that ounce of prevention or pound of response that is 
needed.  And this sociopolitical variability… shapes the effect that disasters of similar 
initial content have in different countries. 
       Seitz and Morris 
“Disasters and Governments” 
 
 
[Disaster reduction is] about looking beyond hazards alone to consider the prevailing 
conditions of vulnerability.  It is the social, cultural, economic, and political situation in a 
country that makes people vulnerable to unfortunate events.  
  United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
  Living with Risk: A global review of disaster reduction initiatives 
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Introduction     
 
 Every year people around the world experience the deadly and destructive wrath 
of natural disasters.  In the year 2002 alone, 66 different large-scale disasters affected the 
lives of over a 100,000 people each.  These 66 events alone resulted in an estimated 
33,756 deaths and close to $20 billion in damage.  Looking at all natural disasters during 
this year, over 500 events affected the lives of 621,000,000 people, left at least 550,000 
people homeless, and took the lives of 50,000 people1.   
Clearly, natural disasters disrupt the lives of individuals, the functioning of 
societies, and the productivity of economies.  In addition to the tremendous number of 
lives lost, natural disasters also destroy homes, schools, farms, and businesses.  Further, 
disasters can have an indirect impact on the institutions that bring order to daily life.  For 
example, when an earthquake destroys a major hospital, the damage is not only physical 
but extends to the broader health care institution of the affected area.  And, as this thesis 
examines, natural disasters push the capacity of governments to protect their citizens 
during emergency situations. 
Importantly, a large cross-country variance can be observed in the impact of 
natural disasters.  Whether impact is measured through the number of people affected, the 
number of people left homeless, the cost, or the number of lives lost, some countries are 
impacted much more than others.  To understand this variance, researchers have 
                                                          
1 Unless otherwise noted, reported data on disasters is taken from the CRED EM-DAT data available at  
http://www.cred.be.  Appendix 1 provides a summary of definitions and categorizations of the EM-DAT. 
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developed a framework that isolates different sources of vulnerability.  For example, 
faults lines, volcanoes, and low-lying coastal areas represent physical (or environmental) 
sources of vulnerability.  However, the observed variance in disaster impact cannot be 
entirely explained by the observed variance in physical vulnerability.  For example, two 
earthquakes of identical magnitude, affecting similarly sized populations, may cause 
vastly different number of destroyed homes or people killed.  Thus, researchers and 
policy makers have also examined social and economic vulnerability, such as low income 
and education levels, as determinants of the impact of natural disasters.  This thesis 
examines the notion of political vulnerability as a source of vulnerability to natural 
disasters.  In a nutshell, are non-democratic, unstable, and/or young regimes impacted 
more by natural disasters when compared to democratic, stable, and experienced 
regimes?   
 
Figure 1:  Direct impact of natural disasters. 
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Figure 2:  Timeline of annual total people affected. 
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Figure 3: Timeline of annual total people killed. 
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Note:   Due to missing data points in both sets of figures, each graph should be considered as representing 
different samples.   
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Figure 4: Timeline of total reported affected divided global population. 
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Figure 5:  Timeline of annual mean of killed divided by affected. 
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Note:  The data points presented above are averages of the respective ratio calculated using all data points 
for each given year.  First the ratio was calculated for each event, then the annual average was calculated 
from the individual ratios in a given year.  Population refers to the population of the country impacted by 
the disaster. 
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As figures 2-5 demonstrate, the global impact of natural disasters has changed 
over the last 100 years.  Looking at absolute measures of disaster severity and impact, 
figures 2 & 3 show that while the annual total number of people affected by disasters has 
risen in recent years, the total number of people killed annually has decreased.  However, 
for analytical purposes, the ratios presented in figures 4 & 5 are more revealing.  Figure 4 
reveals that when measured as a percentage of the global population, the number of 
people affected has increased.  In fact, in 2002 nearly 10% of the global population was 
affected by natural disasters.  This figure indicates that on a global scale disasters have 
become more numerous and severe.  However, as a measure of the relative impact of a 
disaster, the ratio of people killed to people affected shows a downward trend, indicating 
that a larger percentage of the affected population receives sufficient protection and 
survives the disaster. 
Consider as a broad overview the regional variance in the impact that natural 
disasters have on populations in the different continents.  For example, of the 3994 
recorded disasters that have occurred since 1990, over 1400 (nearly 40%) have occurred 
in Asia.  When considering different disaster types, other regional distributional patterns 
emerge.  Again, looking at the recorded disasters since 1990: 
- Nearly 43% of the 277 recorded droughts occurred in Africa. 
- Over 51% of the 320 recorded earthquakes occurred in Asia. 
- Over 57% of the 603 recorded epidemics occurred in Africa. 
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- The occurrence of floods is the most equally distributed.  While nearly 38% (of 
1283 total floods) occurred in Asia, 24% occurred in the America’s, 20% occurred in 
Africa, and 16% occurred in Europe. 
-  Nearly 41% of the 1099 recorded windstorms occurred in Asia while close to 
35% occurred in the Americas.  Europe experienced 15% and Africa experienced 6%. 
 
While nature most likely explains the variance in the occurrence of natural 
disasters, nature alone cannot explain the great deal of observed variance in the impact of 
natural disasters.  For example, when comparing disaster-related mortality figures in Asia 
and in Europe since 1990, the mean for Asia is 397 while the mean for Europe is 61.  In 
other words, the average disaster in Asia kills over six times as many people as the 
average disaster in Europe.  Likewise, when comparing the number of floods and 
windstorms in Asia and Africa, one notices a perplexing anomaly.  During the nineties, 
Europe experienced 50 windstorms (excluding tornadoes and winter storms) and 107 
floods.  In comparison, Africa experienced 30 windstorms but over 140 floods.  If floods 
are associated with windstorms one should expect a roughly constant ratio of floods per 
windstorm.  From the observation that Africa experiences more floods per windstorm 
than Europe one might conclude that African countries lack the capacity to prevent 
flooding during windstorms while the European countries are better able to mitigate and 
control flooding during windstorms. 
When measuring the impact of disasters through the mean number of people left 
homeless by a disaster, Asia suffers more than the other continents.  While for all other 
continents this number is less than 7,000, for Asia this figure is over 80,000.  Clearly,  
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Table 1:  Regional variance in relative mortality rates by disaster type. 
Mean of Ratio of Killed to Affected (all recorded events since 1990.) 
Continent All 
Types 
Earthquake  Epidemic Famine Flood Slide Volcano Wild 
Fire 
Wind 
Storm 
Africa .179 .003 .352 .003 .002 .113 .001 .001 .001 
Americas .007 .006 .012  .004 .064 .001 .001 .007 
Asia  .027 .007 .128 .013 .004 .056 .001 .001 .011 
Europe .026 .003 .017  .027 .122  .011 .016 
Oceania .007 .001 .016  .001 .104 .000 .000 .003 
All .058 .006 .238 .006 .008 .077 .001 .003 .009 
 
while Asia suffers the most events it also suffers the worst impact per event.  Some 
explanation of this observed difference in disaster impact can be found in nature.  For 
example, Asia experiences the highest number of earthquakes, which are the most 
destructive to homes.  However, differences in the strength, number and type of natural 
disasters cannot completely explain the observed difference in the impact that they have. 
 Utilizing the ratio of people killed to people affected as a measure of the 
effectiveness of disaster response, Table 1 above provides a regional overview of the 
effectiveness of disaster response.  Based on the assumption that the number of people 
affected provides a valid proxy measure of the severity of the storm, this ratio expresses 
the disaster impact, measured as the number of people killed, relative to the disaster 
severity.  A high ratio indicates that the impacted population was not adequately 
protected, and the response to the disaster was ineffective in preventing deaths. 
When considering all types of disasters, clearly the relative mortality rate is 
highest in Africa, an indication that African countries lack the response capacity of other 
countries in the world.  Likewise, the low ratio for the Americas and Oceania indicates 
that countries in these regions are better able to respond to natural disaster and protect 
their citizens.  The variance observed in the other columns of this table indicates a 
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regional variance in responding to disasters of identical type and demonstrates that 
variance in disaster type does not completely explain the variance in the impact.  While 
this table does not directly control for variance in magnitude and location the assumption 
that the number of people affected depends on these two variables provides an indirect 
control for these variables when comparing mortality figures through the ratio of killed to 
affected.  
Toward explaining this variance in the impact of natural disaster, a number of 
disaster researchers have noticed a connection between disaster impact and two 
characteristically human variables: wealth and development.  For example, in the World 
Development Report, 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, the World Bank observes that 
“developing countries… suffer the brunt of natural disasters.  Between 1990 and 1998, 94 
percent of the world’s 568 major natural disasters and 97 percent of all natural disaster-
related deaths occurred in developing countries”  (World Bank 2001, p. 170). Likewise, 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations notes that “poverty and population 
pressures increase the costs of natural disasters” and that “unsustainable development 
practices also contribute to the rising impact of natural disasters”  (Annan 1999, p. 6). 
 This thesis builds on the previous research on the socio-economic determinants of 
disaster impact by looking at potential political determinants.  In particular, I examine 
whether levels of democracy, political stability, or regime durability explain some of the 
observed variance in the impact of natural disasters.  I argue that these three 
characteristics contribute to a country’s political vulnerability.  Further, I attempt to 
demonstrate that political vulnerability is just as real as physical vulnerability.  In other 
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words, while fault lines pose an earthquake hazard, I argue that bad politics increases the 
associated risk to lives and livelihoods.   
I present the case for such a connection between political regime characteristics 
and the impact of natural disasters in the three chapters that follow.  In the literature 
review section I provide a multidisciplinary review of relevant natural disaster research.  
While a dearth of “nuts-and-bolts” literature exists along with numerous studies of 
disasters from sociological and development viewpoints, very little of the available 
political science literature addresses the questions that surround natural disasters and the 
impact they have on countries and citizens.  However, in noting that natural disaster relief 
can be considered a public service provided by states similar to programs on public health 
and education, I review the available literature on the relationship between public service 
provision and political institutions and then relate these findings to disaster response.  
Finally, I review a recent United Nations policy document on disaster response.  Utilizing 
the framework of analysis presented by the United Nations International Strategy for the 
Reduction of Natural Disasters along with the findings of previous research, I present the 
theoretical argument for associating the impact of natural disasters with the political 
regime characteristics of countries.  I conclude this chapter by presenting three 
hypotheses regarding an expected causal relationship linking the impact of a natural 
disaster with the level of democracy, political stability, and regime durability in the 
country where the disaster occurs. 
The next two chapters present an empirical examination of the relationship 
between disasters and political institutions.  In chapter 2, four comparative case studies 
demonstrate consistency with the three hypotheses.  Next, chapter 3 examines the validity 
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and generalizability of the hypotheses using a multivariate, large-N statistical analysis of 
the determinants of natural disaster impact.  Data from the Center for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters provides indicators of natural disaster impact that are then 
compared to standard compared, social, economic, and political indicators. 
Overwhelmingly, the data presented here shows that ineffective and non-
responsive political institutions comprise an important source of natural disaster 
vulnerability.  In a comparison of five earthquakes, the highest mortality rates were 
observed in non-democratic countries where corruption hindered the disaster response 
significantly.  Comparing three floods in three democratic countries, one finds evidence 
of the political will to confront the flood threat in all three, but only the durable and stable 
regime possesses the capability to effectively respond.  Analyzing the trends in 
democracy and trends in disaster impact for Nicaragua and Honduras over the last thirty 
years, one notices that the impact of natural disasters decreased faster when democracy 
increased fastest.  In a final case study consisting of nine countries selected based on 
rigorous selection rules, the evidence shows that democracy explains cross-country 
variance in disaster impact when the development variable cannot.   
In addition, a statistical analysis of more than 1500 disasters shows that political 
vulnerability matters just as much as social and economic vulnerability.  Indeed, as 
expected, the impact of natural disaster is less when democracy is greater and when 
stability is greater.  Contrary to expectations the regression results indicate that disaster 
response actually gets worse as a regime exists longer.  Still, consistent with the case-
studies, the large-N regression shows that political institutions matter when a country is 
confronted with the threat of a natural disaster.    
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Chapter 1: Literature Review     
 
Despite its clear policy importance, natural disasters are not a common topic of 
political science researchers.  In contrast, natural disasters and group responses have been 
analyzed by sociologists, some of whom have focused on the behavioral sources of 
vulnerability.  From a more practical viewpoint, both relief fieldworkers and 
development policy analysts agree that the impact of natural disasters is not determined 
purely by nature.  In Living with Risk, The United Nations International Strategy for 
Natural Disaster Reductions provides a comprehensive review of disaster reduction 
initiatives from around the world and along with a conceptual framework for analyzing 
the impact of natural disasters.  Importantly this framework identifies and defines social 
and economic sources of vulnerability along with physical and environmental sources of 
vulnerability.  Finally while education and public health are not identical to natural 
disaster response, these are all services that the government provides to develop social 
capital.  Thus, political science literature on education and public health can be related to 
natural disasters. 
 
Disasters and Disaster Relief: Lessons from the Field  
An important discourse in the literature on “natural disasters” asks if the very 
term is somewhat of a misnomer.  Indeed, the people with the most direct experience in 
responding to natural disasters agree that the “human” factors are just as important as the 
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“natural.”  Anders Alexander, an experienced Red Cross relief worker, notes that “many 
would argue that ‘natural’ hazard is a misleading term, as very little is natural about 
phenomena in which the danger results largely from human decision-making, land use, 
and socio-economic activities” (Alexander 2000, p. 10.)  In this regard, it is important to 
note the consensus regarding some human causes of natural disasters.  For example 
excessive logging can lead to mudslides and development along low lying coastal lands 
puts people at risk to flood and storm related disasters.  However, other human causes of 
natural disasters continue to be debated, for example the relationship between human 
activity, global warming, and the occurrence of devastating storms and floods. 
Likewise, one can dissect the other half of the term natural disaster and ask what 
takes an event of nature (in terms of its direct causes), and makes it into a disaster?  As 
Wijkman and Timberlake note, “a distinction must be made between the ‘trigger events’ 
– too little rain, too much rain, earthshocks, hurricanes – which may be natural, and the 
associated disasters, which may be largely man-made” (Wijkman 1984, p. 11.)  For 
example, seismologists often point out to engineers that earthquakes don’t kill people, 
poorly constructed buildings near fault lines do. 
In this regard, the field of disaster response and relief deals with mitigating the 
devastation of natural disasters.  From the public health aspects of emergencies to the 
logistics of delivering relief supplies to building earthquake resistant homes, this 
discipline is as rich in the literature as it is diversified in the fieldwork2.  While many of 
the technical details found in this literature remains beyond the scope of the present 
study, a number of general themes are pertinent.  Coordination between relief agencies 
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has been identified as a major obstacle to providing effective relief following a disaster 
(Calvi-Parisetti 2003, web).  Likewise, the reliability of early warning systems (Glantz 
2001) and the security of relief workers (IFRC 2002) are top concerns to people involved 
in disaster response.  Finally, the development of standardized methods of assessing 
disaster impact and response from the field is another important topic that appears in this 
literature (UNOCHA 2003, SPHERE 2003)3. 
The activities of two major international organizations involved in disaster 
response help make the concept of disaster response more concrete.  One aspect of 
disaster response relates to post-disaster relief to victims.   For example, the IFRC reports 
that during 2002 it spent $41 million on disaster response to provide aid to a target 
population of over 2 million people (IFRC 2003, p. 7).  Relief supplies delivered by the 
IFRC include quilts to nearly 48,000 flood victims in China (IFRC 2003, p 15), providing 
food, temporary shelter, and basic hygiene items to nearly 2000 victims of an earthquake 
in Indonesia (IFRC 2003, p 1), and food assistance to 20,000 drought victims in 
Uzbekistan (IFRC 2004, p. 1.)  One can imagine the overwhelming financial, logistical, 
social, and cultural obstacles that had to be overcome to facilitate the delivery of these 
supplies.  One can also imagine a number of political obstacles that Red Cross workers 
encounter on a daily basis. 
In contrast to disaster relief, disaster preparedness is an aspect of disaster response 
that occurs before the disaster occurs and focuses on increasing a community’s capacity 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Self-described as serving “the needs of the international humanitarian relief community”, ReliefWeb 
(www.reliefweb.org) provides a large number of field reports from disaster relief workers along with a 
dearth of other nuts-n-bolts information on disaster relief.   
3 While this study deals an overall measure of impact a follow-up analysis could take a more detailed look 
at impact by, for example, distinguishing the numbers of deaths that occurred during the immediate 
flooding emergency versus the number that died later as a result of malnutrition, poor hygiene, and/or 
inadequate water treatment. 
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to respond when a disaster does occur.  Like disaster relief, disaster preparedness 
involves numerous field activities that are crucially linked to the social, political, and 
economic context.  For example, CARE International’s immediate response to a 
destructive cyclone in India in 1999 was followed by a long term disaster preparedness 
program that focused on building cyclone shelters and providing disaster education 
(CARE 2000, p. 25.)  As CARE notes, the success of this program hinges on the 
cooperation of the Indian government, indicating that political institutions do matter.  
 
A Sociological Perspective on Disasters 
   Reflecting the above-cited practitioners of disaster relief, a number of social 
scientists have examined the role of social systems in contributing to disasters.  Indeed, 
by studying the way groups and individuals respond to disasters, both organized and 
spontaneous, many sociologists have concluded that both severity and the final impact of 
a natural disaster depends on the humans response just as much as it depends on the 
natural hazard. 
In an Annual Review of Sociology on the subject of disasters from 1977, 
Quarantelli and Dynes note that “other critics have argued that disasters are inherently 
political phenomena” and goes on to argue “that a disaster is primarily a social 
phenomenon”  (Quarantelli 1977, p. 24.)  Likewise, in an Annual Review published 7 
years later, Kreps applauds the “overdue reflection about how disasters should be 
interpreted as a social problem” (Kreps 1984, p. 317.)   
 Partly, this result follows from revisions in the definition of disaster, while, partly, 
this result follows from early data-based surveys of the impact of natural disasters. 
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Conceptually, Fritz in 1961 advanced a definition that explicitly notes the social aspects 
of disasters:  “Disasters are (a) events that are designated in time and space, which have 
(b) impacts on (c) social units [which] in turn enact (d) responses” (Kreps 1984, p. 311).  
Thus, no longer considered just random events determined solely by nature, social units 
and their responses are now explicitly linked with the standard sociological definition of 
disasters and their impacts.  These conceptual developments in the sociological study of 
disasters gained support from a number of surveys conducted in disaster areas.  In this 
regard, the Disaster Research Center (established in 1963) has been a pioneer in 
collecting and classifying data on disasters, their impact and the responses of the social 
units.  Although these early studies were limited by selection bias and other 
methodological issues, they overwhelmingly support the conclusion that natural disasters 
are inherently social phenomena.    
 
International Development Policy and Disasters  
 Beyond just an academic question, the international development community has 
adopted the causes and implications of natural disasters as an important policy issue.  To 
a large extent this literature focuses on two related issues:  i) developing/poor countries 
are impacted far more than developed/wealthy countries and ii) natural disasters hinder 
development and disaster response encourages development.  For these reasons, disaster 
mitigation has become an important development policy issue.   
In World Development Report 2000/2001, the World Bank notes “poverty and 
lagging development amplify the adverse affects of natural disasters.  Developing 
countries are particularly vulnerable, because they have limited capacity to prevent and 
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absorb these effects” (World Bank 2001, p. 172.)  Both the World Bank and the United 
Nations note that over 95% of disaster related deaths occur in developing countries and 
developing countries lose a higher percentage of GDP to disasters when compared to 
developed countries.     
Examining the link between economic development and disasters vulnerability 
further, Yates, et. al. note that “the evidence clearly shows that natural disasters are a key 
factor in setting back the development process.”  Further, they argue “disasters are a 
crucial element in determining whether poor people escape poverty, remain poor, or 
become even poorer” (Yates, p. 2.)  In preparation for the recent World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, the United Nations Department of Social and Economic 
Affairs presented a background paper on natural disasters and development in which they 
write “the escalation of severe disaster events triggered by natural hazards… are 
increasingly posing a substantive threat to both sustainable development and poverty 
reduction initiatives (UNISDR 2003, p. 2.)  Likewise, in the Human Development Report 
1994: New dimensions of human security, the United Nations Development Program 
argues, “disasters are an integral part of poverty cycle,” and, hence, pose a threat to 
human security (UNDP 2003, p. 29.)   
Finally, in a World Bank working paper, Freeman, et al present the following 
policy recommendation for using disaster management to encourage development: “risk 
management must be a formal component of development planning for countries with 
high natural catastrophe exposure.  Through planning, countries can reduce some of the 
negative impacts on development and improve the situation of poor people during and 
after crises.”             
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The Political Context of Disasters 
 Despite the very clear policy importance of natural disasters and disaster 
response, very little political science literature covers this topic.  While a handful of case 
studies are available, only one cross-national, systematic study of the determinants of 
impact of natural disasters exists.  Again the consensus agrees that human factors, 
specifically government attentiveness and effectiveness, play a large role in determining 
the impact of natural disasters.   
 Some researchers have used the devastating 1999 earthquake in Turkey as a case 
study on the political context of disasters. Measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale, this 
disaster took the lives of over 17,000 people and left nearly 250,000 homeless.  Noting 
the ineffective state response to this disaster, Kinzer observes that “although Turkey lies 
above some of the world’s most dangerous geological faults and is shaken by earthquakes 
every few years, its government had no plan for dealing with them, no disaster-relief 
agency, no civil-defense network, not even an official designated to take charge at such 
moments.” (Kinzer 2001, p 42.)  Kinzer concludes that for many Turks the devastation 
was “the result of a political system that tolerated corruption and contempt for human 
life” (Kinzer 2001, p. 45.)  In contrast, Jalali offers a slightly more favorable assessment 
of the official response to the earthquake.  Characterizing the initial response as “utterly 
inadequate” (Jalali 2002, p. 124), she also writes, “in the ensuing months, state ability to 
aid earthquake victims improved considerably” (Jalali 2002, p. 127.)  Further observing 
that media coverage of the devastation encouraged more effective state response, she 
argues that “an ideal response system… can only be based on state-civil society relations 
that are both collaborative and adversarial” (Jalali 2002, p. 121).  Naturally one can ask 
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about the regime characteristics that best facilitates such a balanced state-civil society 
relationship.   
 Two interesting assessments of the “lessons learned” by two Central American 
countries following Hurricane Mitch go so far as to link state failure in providing 
effective disaster assistance with the failure of global economic policies.  In both studies 
the authors conclude that neo-liberalism’s emphasis on the free market and a weak state 
has reduced both state capability to mitigate the effect of disasters along with government 
readiness to “intervene” during times of crisis.  Rocha and Christoplos note that despite 
comprehensive and constructive critiques of the government’s response to Mitch, recent 
disasters demonstrate that appropriate policy changes have not been implemented (Rocha 
2001, p. 248).  The authors place the “blame for the destruction firmly at the feet of neo-
liberalism” (Rocha 2001, p. 249).  Likewise, Wisner observes “to understand why the 
lessons of Mitch were not internalized by El Salvador’s central government permanent 
state apparatus and translated into action, one must understand the current government as 
a reflection of a neo-liberal state” (Wisner 2001, p. 258.)  However, their conclusions 
should be countered with evidence from Chapter 3 that indicates that the “institutional 
learning” hypothesis of government response effects is not valid. 
In what appears to be the most comprehensive study on the political context of 
disasters, Davis and Seitz employ a cross-national statistical analysis to examine “why do 
disasters of the same type sometimes differentially impact various countries?” (Davis 
1982, p. 547.)  In the introduction they note that “human complicity is observable even in 
the causal agents of disasters” (Davis 1982, p. 548), and then they go on to examine 
potential social, economic, and political determinants of disaster impact.  Their study  
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Table 2:  Regression of disaster impact (measured as number killed.) 
 Regression Coefficient for  
 
Overall 
R2 
Government 
Instability 
Social  
Context 
Resources Government 
Effectiveness 
Accident .23 0 .53 .27 -.50 
Volcano .33 .42 .04 .16 0 
Earthquake .30 .57 .10 .05 -.07 
Storm .03 .06 .11 -.02 0 
Drought .85 .31 -.24 .07 .24 
Epidemic .67 .27 -.82 -.51 .66 
Flood .02 -.03 -.14 -.08 0 
Landside .00 0 0 0 0 
Fire .00 0 0 0 0 
 
Source: Davis, Morris and Steven T. Seitz.  “Disasters and Governments.”  Journal of  
Conflict Resolution. Vol. 26, Iss. 3, p. 563 (1982.) 
 
employs a structural model that posits government effectiveness, government instability, 
available resources, and social context as independent variables and disaster impact 
(operationalized using number of people killed) as the dependent variable.  An important 
aspect of their research design is to separately analyze disasters of different types.  In all 
they consider earthquakes, floods, accidents, landslides, volcanoes, fires, storms, 
epidemics, and droughts.  The authors find significant correlations for each of the four 
independent variables with at least one disaster type.  They also identify drought and 
epidemic as best explained by the model.  Interestingly, they find that for most disasters 
government stability and effectiveness are more important than the available resources in 
determining the impact of the disaster (Davis 1982, p. 593.)  In other words their results 
show that, in a general sense, the impact of a disaster is influenced, sometimes heavily, 
by the politics of the affected country.   
While methodologically innovative this study is also limited by the failure to 
control for the strengths of the disaster when explaining the mortality figures.  In a 
significant contribution to the disaster research literature, the authors illustrate the use of 
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standardized disaster data4 in assessing and comparing the impact of disasters.  Further, 
they strengthen their analysis with a detailed discussion of the reliability and validity of 
disaster data.  However, despite the many achievements of this piece the final conclusion 
is limited by the fact that neither the mortality figures nor the model control for the 
magnitude or location of disaster as a determinant of the impact.  Perhaps, severe 
earthquakes occurred more often in politically unstable countries.  As explained in 
Chapter 3, this obstacle can be overcome by using the number of people affected as a 
proxy for the type, magnitude and location of the disaster.   
As an aside, it should be noted that in regards to the predictive capacity and use as 
a planning tool, the presentation of this study is limited by the omission of standard errors 
or t-scores for the coefficients.  While not the primary focus of the present study, this 
application of regression results is discussed in Appendix D. 
 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction: A framework for analysis 
Reviewing a number of case studies that illustrate the connection between the 
impact of disasters and the underlying social, economic, and political context, the United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) presents a number of basic 
guidelines in their preliminary version of the document Living with Risk: A global review 
of disaster reduction initiatives.  In addition to a section on the political context of 
disaster reduction, many of the suggestions contain a number of explicit and implicit 
political factors.  Further, this document provides a sound framework for analyzing 
natural disasters and identifying their human causes. 
                                                          
4 They utilize the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance Disaster History Update Program as their 
source for disaster data. 
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 To begin with, ISDR defines a number of key terms related to disasters and 
disaster response (UNISDR 2002, p. 23-24.)5: 
 • Disaster:  A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society 
causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses that exceed the 
ability of the affected community/society to cope using its own resources. 
• Hazard: A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon, or human activity 
which may cause loss of life or injury, property damage, social or economic disruption or 
environmental degradation. 
• Vulnerability: A set of conditions and processes resulting from physical, social, 
economic, and environmental factors, which increase the susceptibility of a community to 
the impact of hazards. 
• Coping Capabilities/Capacity: The manner in which people and organizations 
use existing resources to achieve various beneficial ends during unusual, abnormal, and 
adverse conditions of a disaster event or process. 
•  Risk: The probability of harmful consequences, or expected loss (of lives, 
people injured, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted, or environment damaged) 
resulting from the interaction between natural or human induced hazards and 
vulnerable/capable conditions. 
In addition to defining these basic terms, the ISDR postulates the following relationship 
between risk (R), hazard (H), vulnerability (V), and capacity (C), 
                                                          
5 The ISDR reports that one of its functions is to provide interested researchers and policy makers with a 
 
 23
R = H x (V/C).      (i) 
They further note, “disaster is a function of risk” (UNISDR 2002, p. 25.) 
 Within this framework, Living with Risk examines and highlights a number of 
steps that can reduce the impact of disasters by reducing vulnerability and increasing 
capacity.  They begin by listing a number of factors of vulnerability using four broad 
categories of vulnerability (UNISDR 2002, p. 47.): 
• Physical: density levels, remoteness of the settlement, its sitting, design and 
materials used for critical infrastructure and for housing. 
• Social: levels of literacy and education, public health, peace and security, 
human rights, good governance, social equity, positive traditional values, customs and 
beliefs, and collective organizations. 
 • Economic: Gross and individual income, economic reserves, national debt, 
access to credit and insurance, economic diversity, infrastructure. 
 • Ecological:  Resource depletion, resource degradation, resilience of ecological 
systems, biodiversity, exposure to toxics and pollutants. 
 
While they do not explicitly list “Political Vulnerability” as a category, a number of 
political factors are present in this list.  For example, they write, “social vulnerability is 
also linked with… the state of domination and power relations in the concerned society” 
(UNISDR 2002, p. 47.)  Further, social factors such as peace and security, human rights, 
and good governance are perhaps better listed as political factors.  In addition, scholars of  
                                                                                                                                                                             
uniform and homogenous set of definitions for disaster related terms. 
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Figure 6: Factors of vulnerability.  
 
 
 
Source: The United Nations Inter-Agency Secretariat for the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.  
Living with Risk: A global review of disaster reduction initiatives.  Geneva: The United Nations (2002). 
 
 
political economy have noted the factors such as income, debt, and infrastructure reflect 
not just economic conditions, but also political conditions.  Finally, controlling resource 
depletion and degradation, preserving ecological systems and biodiversity, and limiting 
exposure to toxics and pollutants requires both political will to enact such legislation and 
state capability to enforce it.  Thus, while the ISDR does not explicitly list political 
determinants of disaster impact, they do seem to indicate that political vulnerability to 
natural disasters is just as important as social, economic, ecological, and physical 
vulnerability.  Indeed, defining politically vulnerability as the set of political institutions 
and conditions that increase a community’s susceptibility to the impact of natural 
disasters, this model is improved with the inclusion of cluster of political variables that 
comprise the political dimension of vulnerability. 
 
 25
Moving beyond a static model of risk, Balkie et al, in figure 6, develop a dynamic 
model where risk results from a series of steps that progressively increase vulnerability.  
Figure 7 shows some of the political factors that influence vulnerability and risk 
throughout the progression.  As root causes, both limited access to power and political 
ideology both political vulnerability.  As dynamic pressures, political vulnerability is 
present as lack of local institutions and lack of press freedom.  Finally as unsafe 
conditions political vulnerability relates to dangerous locations, unprotected buildings, 
and lack of public actions.  Indeed, though not explicitly listed, political vulnerability is 
an important variable in the dynamical processes that results in natural hazards becoming 
risks to human populations. 
 
 
Figure 7:  The progression of vulnerability.   
 
  
Source: The United Nations Inter-Agency Secretariat for the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.  
Living with Risk: A global review of disaster reduction initiatives.  Geneva: The United Nations (2002). 
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In addition to the theoretical framework just described, Living with Risk also 
contains a number of policy recommendations for reducing natural disaster risk.  Among 
many of the policy recommendations, the ISDR recommends developing institutions that 
encourage disaster mitigation.  They write: 
“Coherent and comprehensive approaches to building institutional frameworks,  
at both national and local levels, are essential if one is to speak seriously of a 
 sustained commitment to disaster risk reduction…  The vitality and effectiveness  
of the resulting organizational frameworks and operational capabilities remain  
based on the understanding and motivations of public interests”  (UNISDR 2002, p. 112.) 
However, it is important to note that not all governments seek to understand or be 
motivated by the public interest.  Further, when the political will and concern for the 
public interest does exist, the government does not always possess the operational 
capabilities to implement effective disaster reduction policies. 
 In summary, while the risk framework presented by the ISRD does not explicitly 
list political vulnerability as a source of risk to natural hazards, perhaps they should.  
They do note a number of political factors and political vulnerability describes some 
aspects of Blakie’s progression of vulnerability.  Further, several of the policy 
recommendations described in Living with Risk require certain political prerequisites.  
Thus, as a modification to figure 6 above, I offer figure 8 below. 
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Figure 8:  Sources of vulnerability, hazard, and risk. 
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Public Service Provision and Political Institutions 
While they have not yet considered natural disaster response directly, political 
scientists interested in domestic political economy and its outcomes have reached 
conclusions that are applicable to the question of the effectiveness of disaster response.  
To begin with, this literature follows the realist tradition and assumes that the state acts as 
a rational, self-interested actor and provides certain public goods, such as public health 
and education, to advance the goal of long-term economic and political interests.  In this 
context the state uses disaster response to protect both physical and social capital, i.e. its 
tax base.  Thus disaster response bears this similarity to state sponsored education and 
public health programs.  While many differences exist between disaster response, 
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education and public health, the research on the political aspects of the latter does shed 
some light on the political aspects of the former. 
 Providing a solid foundation for a rich research discipline in political science, 
Olson develops a realist theory of domestic political economy and the reinforcing 
relationship between democracy and capitalism.  His conclusion: “The conditions 
necessary for a lasting democracy are the same necessary for the security of property and 
contract rights that generates economic growth” (Olson 1993, p. 567.)  In reaching this 
conclusion, Olson first assumes that in a primitive, anarchic society, economic activity is 
hindered by a political system that encourages competitive theft among “roving bandits.”  
Olson then notes that a “stationary bandit,” i.e. a dictator who gains a monopoly on theft 
through violence and taxation, enjoys a competitive advantage in the form of limited 
protection of investment when compared to the “roving bandit.”  However, he points out 
this advantage is limited by the insecurity of autocratic regimes which forces the dictator 
to take a short term view toward optimizing revenue through taxation at the cost of long 
term investment.  Finally noting that a secure government that respects individual rights 
provides the strongest investment incentive, Olson concludes that the conditions 
necessary for democracy -- secure rights and the rule of law -- are also the conditions 
necessary for long term economic growth.  As central variables of Olson’s argument, 
investment uncertainty and incentive provide the link between political institutions and 
economic outcomes. 
 In a similar manner, Lake and Baum consider public services, specifically public 
health and education, as an outcome of the political system.  Assuming first that states 
“produce services in exchange for revenue,” they argue that their “monopoly on the 
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legitimate use of force… gives states a comparative advantage in producing goods where 
collective actions problems… and other barriers to voluntary exchange would otherwise 
create market failures” (Lake & Baum 2001, p. 590.)  They also note “the state’s ability 
to earn rents, in turn, is a function of the public services produced for citizens” (Lake & 
Baum 2001, p. 592.)  Finally, they conclude that since the political market is more 
competitive under democracy than under autocracy, “democracies will provide higher 
levels of public services to their citizens than autocracies” (Lake & Baum 2001, p. 598.) 
 In addition to developing a rigorous theory of domestic political economy, Lake 
and Baum also provide strong statistical tests of the hypothesis that democracies provide 
more public services than autocracies.  First, they utilize a cross-sectional ordinary least 
squares (OLS) analysis positing that the level of public service depends on the level of 
democracy along with other control variables (Lake 2001, p. 606.)  Calculating the OLS 
coefficient and significance levels for various indicators of education and public, they 
conclude that the data demonstrate a robust association of levels of public services with 
levels of democracy.  Secondly, in pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) model they 
posit additional terms to account for changes in democracy levels and a general upward 
trend in education and public health (Lake 2001, p. 611.)  Again, they find evidence for a 
significant association between numerous indicators of social service provision and levels 
of democracy (Lake 2001, p. 612.)  Finally developing this analysis further, Baum and 
Lake investigate the indirect economic effects of democracy through the state’s provision 
of public service.  They argue that by increasing human capital, the provision of public 
services encourages economic growth, and since democracies provide more effective 
public services, they exert an indirect benefit to the economy through human capital 
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(Baum 2003, p. 333.)  Using a system of two equations, one that posits public service 
provision as dependent on democracy and another that posits growth as dependent on 
public service provision (the Baum 2003, p. 340), they conclude that “the effect of 
democracy on economic growth is subtle, indirect, and contingent on levels of 
development” (Baum 2003, p. 345.)      
 Since disaster response is similar to public health and education in a number of 
ways, one can use these research results to theorize on the political context of natural 
disasters.  Importantly, like public health and education, disaster response contributes to 
the available capital of an economy and the tax-base of the state.  While public health and 
education constitute an investment of future human capital, disaster response protects 
physical and human capital from natural disasters.  In other words, disaster response is a 
form of insurance for the rational, self-interested state.  Likewise, since different regimes 
types employ different strategies toward building and protecting human and physical 
capital, we can expect that the regime type of a state will have some impact on the level 
and effectiveness of disaster response in that country.  Further extrapolation of Baum and 
Lake’s conclusion suggests that democratic governments provide more effective disaster 
response than non-democratic governments. 
 
A Summary and Three Hypotheses   
To summarize the above literature review from a variety of viewpoints the 
consensus agrees that the impact of natural disasters is determined not just by nature but 
also by people and social arrangements.  In this regard, social and economic vulnerability 
have been isolated as sources of risk and are considered just as real as physical and 
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ecological vulnerability.  Clearly, the available research suggests a fourth source of 
vulnerability: political vulnerability.     
Conceptually, we can link political institutions with disaster response through two 
intervening variables: political will and state capability.  If a country possesses both the 
political will and the state capability to respond to natural disasters, then we can expect 
that disaster response will effectively mitigate the impact of natural disasters.  If either or 
both conditions are missing, we can expect that political vulnerability will decrease the 
disaster response and increase the impact of natural disasters.  For example, many 
disaster preparedness steps, such as planning evacuation routes, enforcing building codes, 
and building early warning systems, require both the political will and the capability to 
take these steps.  As another example, we can expect that the security and coordination of 
relief workers improves when the government possesses the political will and capability 
to provide security and infrastructure for coordination.  Considering the security of relief 
workers further, a regime characterized as democratic but unstable might possess the 
political will to provide security for relief workers but not the capability to prevent 
banditry and similar sources of insecurity.  In this case, political vulnerability results in a 
decrease in response capacity and an increase in disaster impact.  Finally, it should be 
noted that for countries that lack the state capacity to respond, a number of international 
aid organizations are willing to assist if the will of political leaders allows such 
assistance. 
Like other actors involved in disaster response, the state is faced with a collective 
action problem when deciding on the level of disaster response it will provide.  Investing 
in disaster response is costly and the payoff is uncertain.  For example, implementing 
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housing codes that reduces the vulnerability of homes costs the state both politically and 
economically.  Building inspectors and enforcers require salaries while builders and 
investors are unhappy when their costs rise.  And since no one knows if a disaster will 
ever strike everyone is uncertain of whether the cost and effort will pay off.  Which leads 
to the important question of why would the state choose to bear the costs of reducing 
vulnerability to natural disasters? 
Following the realist tradition of domestic political economy, the state behaves as 
a rational, self-interested actor and strategically implements policies with specific goals 
and interests.  Variance in a policy outcome, for example disaster response, is explained 
in terms of variance in the goals of the state and the decision-making environment.  To a 
large extent states share two identical goals: i) continued existence as the legitimate 
authority, and ii) increased tax revenue. By protecting citizens and assets disaster 
response advances both goals.  Thus for sake of political survival and economic gain the 
state has an interest in protecting their citizens against natural disasters. 
While all states want to effectively mitigate natural disasters, not all of them do it 
effectively.  Indeed, when the state lacks the political will to bear the costs of protecting 
against natural disasters or when the state does not possess the capability to respond, the 
goals of legitimacy and taxes do not translate into reduced disaster impact.  It is the 
decision-making environment that determines the effectiveness of disaster response.   
In particular, the decision-making environment of the state varies in three key 
areas that, in turn, influence the political will and state capability to confront natural 
disasters.  While this list is not all-inclusive, three regime characteristics influence the 
decision-making environment: regime type, the present level of legitimacy, and the size 
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of the state apparatus.  As Olson describes, the type of regime influences how the state 
weighs long-term benefits versus short-term costs, and thus impacts the decision-making 
environment of the state.  Likewise, as low levels of legitimacy present immediate threats 
to the survival of the state, the decision-making environment also changes with this 
regime characteristic.  Finally, the decision-making environment also varies with the 
number of years that the regime has existed, as this regime characteristic influences the 
state’s capability to implement policy.   
Thus in a rational choice theory of the state and natural disaster response, all 
states attempt to reduce the impact of natural disasters to advance the goals of increased 
legitimacy and increased revenue, but the decision-making environment determines the 
level of political will and state capability to pursue this goal and thus directly influences 
the effectiveness of disaster response policies.  As a result, we can hypothesize the desire 
and ability of a government to implement effective disaster response policies depends on 
three regime characteristics: level of democratization, political stability, and durability.  
By postulating that democratic, durable, and stable regimes experience a decision-making 
environment that encourages both the will and capability to effectively protect citizens 
from natural disasters, we can connect the impact of a natural disaster with the underlying 
political institutions of the impacted country.  Thus, I offer the following three 
hypotheses relating regime characteristics to the impact of natural disasters:   
H1:  Democratic states are impacted less by natural disasters.  
H2:  Politically stable states are impacted less by natural disasters 
H3:  States with durable governments are impacted less by natural disasters. 
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The remainder of this thesis is an empirical examination of these hypotheses 
through case studies and statistical analysis.  In what follows, case studies demonstrate 
consistency while the statistical analysis tests validity and generalizability. 
As an aside, a statistical model of disaster impact that provides accurate and precise 
predictions of impact indicators, such as people killed, would equip disaster relief 
planners with important information before, during and immediately following a disaster.  
While developing such an early warning system is not the focus of this thesis, the 
risk/vulnerability framework provides a solid foundation for such an endeavor.  The 
statistical analysis of chapter 3, which focuses on hypotheses testing rather than 
forecasting, does represent a step in this direction.  Such an application of these results is 
presented in Appendix D.
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Figure 9:  A rational choice theory of the state and disaster vulnerability. 
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Chapter 2: Case Studies     
 
In this chapter, I present four sets of case studies that demonstrate consistency with the 
three hypotheses relating the impact of natural disasters to the regime characteristics 
affected country.  In each set of case studies, disaster events are the unit of analysis and I 
focus on the impacts and contexts of these events.  In the first set, I compare five recent 
major earthquakes and conclude that corruption in non-democratic governments can 
hinder disaster response.  In the second set, I compare three recent floods and observe 
that while democracy is associated with the political will to respond, political instability 
can hinder the actual response.  In the fourth set, I compare changes in levels of 
democracy with changes in the relative impact of disasters in Nicaragua and Honduras 
and conclude that the observed patterns are consistent with the predictions of the risk 
equation and the concept of political vulnerability.  In the fourth and final case study, I 
attempt to overcome the case selection shortcomings of the previous case studies by 
employing rigorous case selection rules that control for human development when 
associating disaster response with democracy.   While the first three case studies “tell the 
story” that link political institutions with the impact of natural disasters (i.e. to establish 
consistency with the hypotheses), the analysis of a large-N dataset in the next chapter 
provides a more robust assessment of the validity and generalizability of the hypothesis.  
Finally, the fourth case study acts as a bridge between the two assessments.   
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Earthquakes around the world: Mexico, Japan, Turkey, India, and Algeria   
This set of case studies examines five major earthquakes that have occurred 
within the last twenty years.  Except for one, all of them occurred in developing 
countries.  In each of these disasters, mortality figures are in the thousands.  However, the 
ratio of people killed to people affected shows a great deal of variance.  In fact this ratio -
- an indication of the government’s ability to protect and rescue its citizens during natural 
disasters -- is lowest for the two countries that are most democratic.  Noteworthy, 
allegations of corruption engulfed the other three governments following the disaster.  
 
The Disaster Context 
On September 19, 1985, Mexico City rocked from the tremors of an 8.1 Richter 
earthquake on the edge of this populated town.  This disaster affected over 100,000 
people and left between 8,700 and 9,500 people dead.  The disaster injured 40,000 people 
and caused an estimated $4 billion in damage. The health care system for this city was 
hurt badly from the unfortunate collapse of a hospital during the earthquake. 
A 7.2 Richter earthquake impacted the Japanese port city Kobe on January 17, 
1995.  Causalty figures range from 5,500 to 6,400.  Between 200,000 and 300,000 people 
were left either temporarily or permanently homeless following the disaster.  Ensuing 
fires destroyed 800,000 square meters.  Over 100,000, or one out of five, buildings were 
destroyed.  Extensive damage to the port contributed to direct economic damage 
estimated at  $147 billion.   
 On August 17, 1999, warnings by seismologist regarding the physical 
vulnerability posed by fault lines in western Turkey became horribly true when a 7.8 
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Richter earthquake hit the Izmit Bay region south of Istanbul.  An estimated 17,000 
people died, an estimated 20,000 buildings were destroyed, transportation and 
communications networks were severely damaged, and an oil refinery burned for three 
days. 
 A staggering 20,000-30,000 people died when a 7.7 Richter earthquake impacted 
the Gujarat state of India on January 26, 2001.  Like Turkey and Mexico, India suffers 
from overpopulation and a concentration of poverty in urban shanties.  This was 
particularly true for the impacted area of the earthquake where 16 million people were 
affected (a particularly high number for Earthquakes of this magnitude6.)  The United 
Nations Development Program estimated that more than one million homes were 
destroyed (UNDP 2001.) 
 Recently, a 6.7 Richter earthquake devastated the Algerian capital of Algeria on 
May 21, 2003.  According to the Government of Algeria the earthquake resulted in 2,268 
dead, 10,147 wounded, 200,000 homeless, and $5 billion in repair costs.  Another 
assessment points out that the earthquake destroyed 40-50% of health structures in the 
affected area. 
 
The Response Context 
 Of these five cases of major earthquakes, three were followed by allegations of 
corruption and state ineffectiveness, while two were not.  In Mexico, Turkey, and 
Algeria, the both lay people and scholars agree that the disasters did not have to be as 
devastating as they were.  In these countries poor building code regulation is largely seen 
                                                          
6 For all recorded magnitude 7.0 or higher earthquakes recorded since 1900, the mean number of people 
affected is 1.2 million. 
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as the cause of the extensive physical damage while uncaring and ineffective state 
disaster response efforts hindered rescue efforts after the disaster.  Rampant state 
corruption in a one-party government is considered the underlying factor that increased 
the devastation of these earthquakes. 
 In contrast, assessments of the earthquakes in India and Japan do not mention 
state corruption or ineffectiveness as important factors that contributed to the damage.  
One assessment of the Kobe disaster notes that the Japanese building codes had a major 
revision for concrete-frame buildings and a more limited revision for steel-frame 
buildings in 1981 and that effective enforcement of these building codes reduced the 
potential damage (EQE 2003, website) and that without the enforcement of this building 
code the disaster would have been much worse.  Likewise, the ISDR observed the 
sustained national effort to develop response capacity (UNISDR 2002, p. 83) in India and 
the use of a vulnerability atlas that included earthquake hazards to guide development 
and land-use decisions (UNISDR 2002, p. 228).  Still these countries are not without their 
problems.  Enforcement of buildings codes was a serious problem in India before the 
quake and poor security of relief workers and supplies hindered immediate relief efforts.  
Regarding the Kobe earthquake, one assessment concludes “the Kobe Earthquake 
dramatically illustrates the damage that can be expected to modern industrialized society 
from earthquakes. Most of what happened could have been predicted, and much of the 
damage was preventable”  (EQE 2003, web). 
 One way to assess and compare the effectiveness of the response to these different 
disasters is to compare the relative impact of the disaster using the ratio of the number of 
people killed to the number of people affected.  This figure provides a way to compare  
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Table 3:  Comparison of the level and effectiveness of disaster response. 
 
 Magnitude Affected Killed Relative Impact     
  Mexico 8.1 100,000 8776 0.0878 
Japan 7.2 1,500,000 5502 0.0037 
Turkey 7.4 715,000 17,127 0.0240 
India 7.7 15,900,000 20,005 0.0013 
Algeria 6.7 210,000 2268 0.0108 
    
 
the impact of the disaster (number of people killed) but controls for the potential severity 
of the disaster (number of people affected.)  The basic rationale is that two disasters of 
roughly equal severity will affect roughly equal numbers of people, but that the number 
of people killed will vary depending on the response.  Table 3 provides this figure for the 
five earthquakes just described.  This table shows that while the Earthquakes in Japan and 
India affected more people than the others, the relative mortality rate is less than the other 
two countries.  This result indicates that response efforts in Japan and India were more 
effective than in the other countries.   
 
The Political Context 
 As noted above, the earthquakes in Mexico, Turkey, and Algeria were all 
followed by serious charges of corruption.  This fact underlies other similarities between 
the governments of these three regimes during the time period of the disaster.  To a large 
extent Mexico in 1985 and Algeria in 2003 were non-democratic countries with one-party 
rule over the government.  While the Turkish government has some elements of 
institutional democracy, the military heavily influences the government and the state 
regularly limits civil and political liberties. 
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 These three governments also differ in many ways.  In Mexico, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) enjoyed 70 years of uninterrupted rule after first coming to 
power in 1929.  In other words, while the Mexican political system was not democratic in 
1985, it was stable and highly durable.  In comparison, the Turkish government exhibited 
durability but not stability.  This well established state co-exists with a turbulent civil 
society characterized by continual social protest, political cleavage, and civil conflict.  
Finally, the Algerian government cannot be characterized as either stable or durable.  
This young regime also suffers from protest, cleavages, and conflict. 
 In contrast with Mexico, Algeria and Turkey, both Japan and India were 
considered well-established democracies at the time of the earthquakes.    Freedom House 
characterizes both countries as free, parliamentary democracies.  In addition both 
governments originated following World War II, implying similar levels of durability.  
However, while the Japanese government enjoys a high degree of political stability, 
India’s highly pluralistic society exerts many regional and ethnical strains on the 
democratic state resulting in continuous low level political instability.   
 
Conclusion 
One conclusion of this comparison can best be summarized through the following 
quotes:  
- Mexico: “The earthquake highlighted government corruption, when it became 
clear that cronies of the ruling party had evaded safety regulations in the 
construction industry.”   
- Algeria: “Algerians are blaming rampant corruption, and the resulting violations  
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Table 4:  Democracy, corruption, and disaster response.  
 
 
Fully  
Democratic 
Accusations of 
Corruption 
Disaster  
Response 
Japan Yes No Effective 
India Yes No Effective 
Turkey No Yes Not Effective 
Mexico No Yes Not Effective 
Algeria No Yes Not Effective 
 
 
of building codes, for much of the massive death toll and devastation of the earth 
quake.”  
- Turkey: “If our leaders cared about human life, they would have been ready for  
this earthquake, but it just isn’t a priority for them.”   
While these comments exemplify the tragedies in these three non-democratic countries, a 
review of the literature in the two democratic countries did not uncover major accusations 
of corruption or government ineffectiveness following the earthquakes in those countries.  
Comparing the levels of democracy with the number of people killed relative to the 
number of people affected definitely supports the hypothesis that democratic countries 
protect their citizens during natural disasters better than non-democratic countries.  In 
addition, this comparison indicates that high-level corruption in non-democratic countries 
severely limits both the political will and the state capability to respond to natural 
disasters. 
 
Mozambique, Bangladesh, Germany: Massive Flooding  
Between the 1998 and 2002, Germany, Bangladesh, and Mozambique all experienced 
extensive flooding.  As opposed to Bangladesh and Mozambique where hundreds of 
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people died from the floods, less than one hundred people died in the “hundred year 
flood” of Germany.  While all three countries are considered at least somewhat 
democratic, the stability and durability of Germany far exceeds that of Bangladesh and 
Mozambique.  These cases show that in some democratic countries the political will to 
respond to natural disasters exists while the state capability is limited by political 
instability. 
 
The Disaster Context 
In Bangladesh, the annual monsoon season from June to September always brings 
massive flooding.  In 1998, the devastation was particularly bad.  Two months of rain 
flooded the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Megna rivers and left nearly 70% of the country 
covered with floodwaters.  The floods affected 12% of the population and caused over 2 
million in damage, left 35 million homeless, and resulted in 600 to 1000 mortality cases.  
In the aftermath of the flood severe agricultural losses lead to food shortages and 
malnutrition, poor sanitation helped diseases spread, and this deadly combination of 
hazard and vulnerability resulted in epidemics. At least a million people suffered from 
dysentery, fever, bronchitis and similar illnesses.  The International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) assessed the situation as follows: 
 “Three quarters of a million hectares of agricultural land are currently submerged  
and most of the autumn rice crops are ruined. The effects of the flood, in  
particular on the health and economic conditions of the population, will persist  
long after the water recedes, with the worst period being until the next crop has  
been harvested.”  (Rekenthaler, web.) 
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Like Bangladesh, Mozambique is also prone to flooding.  The Save and Limpopo 
rivers both flooded in February 2000, impacting the country profoundly.  Over 1,500,000 
people (10% of the total population) were affected, over 800 people died, over 200,000 
people lost their homes, and 473,000 required food aid.  The World Bank estimates $272 
million in direct damage costs, $215 million indirect damage costs, $65 million in relief 
costs, $11 million in damage to health infrastructure, and around 500 (8% of total) 
primary schools were affected by flooding.  The FAO estimates that close to 80% of 
livestock in the affected areas has been lost. Malnutrition followed, and two epidemics 
affected over 18,000 people. 
While Germans who live along the Elbe River are familiar with minor flooding, 
the floods in August 2002 made significant news around the world.  Dubbed a “hundred 
year flood” by many, this flood caused over $9.2 billion dollars in damage.  Luckily for 
residents here, 42.5% of the damage was covered by insurance (UNISDR 2002, p. 12.)  
Compared to Bangladesh and Mozambique, the floods affected a comparatively small 
number of people.  In total, 330,000 people, only .4% of the German population, were 
affected by the floods.  As a result of the floods, twenty-seven people died in Germany 
and 109 through out Europe.  No epidemics followed the flooding. 
 
The Vulnerability/Capacity Context 
For Bangladesh, major physical sources of vulnerability include geographical 
location, climate, and geomorphology.  In addition, high population density and poverty 
create social vulnerability.  Likewise, the agricultural economy is highly vulnerable to 
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disruption as a result of flooding and the underdeveloped public health system does not 
possess the capacity to respond.  The 1998 floods overwhelmed local capacity and 
international assistance was required. 
In Mozambique the floods also overwhelmed local capacity and the government 
appealed for international assistance (GOM 2003, web.).  Initial response efforts focused 
on using boats and helicopters to rescue people stranded by the floods.   However, an 
official from the Mozambique Disaster Management Institute reported that “we need 
more helicopters and more fuel”  (Disasterrelief.org 2003, web.)  Despite these 
limitations, the Mozambican navy and local fire brigades did help save 45,000 vulnerable 
stranded people. (IFRC 2003, p. 61).    
German response capacity was not overwhelmed in the 2002 flooding.  While the 
IFRC did supply relief aid to many surrounding countries, Germany did not require 
international assistance.  The german government provided $500 million in immediate 
aid and pledged another $6.9 billion in long-term assistance.   
 Interestingly, despite the different capabilities of these three governments, they all 
demonstrate some level of political will to confront disasters.  Each government had an 
established flood plan and some emergency response capability.  In fact, the ISDR notes 
successful disaster preparedness efforts in each country (UNISDR 2002, pp. 7, 69, 83-87, 
98-100, 104, 126-29, 139, 145, 179, 191-93, 196-97, 212, 240, 246-47, 251.)  
 
The Political Context 
In 1998, Freedom House characterized Bangladesh as a partially free, 
parliamentary democracy (Freedom House 2003, Web.)  However, the current 
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democratic regime is recent and 1998 was characterized by political instability as a major 
opposition party boycotted the parliament and staged numerous protests.  Political 
violence also increased during this year (Shehabuddin, web). 
Freedom House classifies the Government of Mozambique as a partly-free 
presidential-parliamentary democracy (Freedom House 2003, web.)  The Government of 
Mozambique claims that civil war ended in 1992 and “was followed by multi-party 
elections in 1994” (GOM 2003, web.)  However, corruption continues as a problem and 
police were observed looting evacuated private homes during the disaster (IFRC 2003, p. 
65). 
Freedom House describes the German government as a free, parliamentary 
democracy (federal) (Freedom House 2003, web.)  Free and fair elections are regularly 
held and political parties are strong.  The current German regime has been in place since 
the end of World War II and political violence has not been very common. 
 
Other Contexts 
Because of its geography and physical climate, Bangladesh is more vulnerable to 
natural disasters than any other country in the world.  Likewise, poverty, over population, 
poor public health, and an unindustrialized economy create sources of vulnerability and 
increased natural hazard risk for this country.  Continuous natural disasters overwhelm 
local capacity, resulting in long-term development setbacks.  While 1998 may have been 
a bad year for Bangladesh, it is part of a natural disaster cycle that heavily influences this 
country.   
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In Mozambique, geography and climate both create natural hazards.  Likewise, 
poverty, international debt, poor sanitation, lack of education all increase vulnerability.  
Internal and external security threats are a problem that limits state capacity.  Finally, left 
over landmines that are moved by mudflows increase the risk to people.   
 Compared to Mozambique and Bangladesh and most other countries, Germany is 
highly developed socially, economically, and politically.  The German economy is highly 
productive and the country is very industrialized.  Germany also possesses effective 
education, health, and welfare systems. 
 
Conclusions 
Despite the differences in their political systems, the Governments of Bangladesh, 
Mozambique, and Germany all demonstrated the political will to confront natural 
disasters in their countries.  Assessments of these disasters did not contain charges of 
corruption imbedded in the political system of the countries as factors that contributed to 
the impact of these disasters.  Further, unlike Turkey following the earthquake, officials 
in these countries did not turn down or impede international assistance when it was 
needed.  Finally, the ISDR notes the numerous disaster preparedness and relief programs 
and plans by all three governments.     
However, differences do exist in the effectiveness of the disaster response within 
these countries.  While all three events are considered “Great Floods” for their area (an 
indication of relative strength), the “Great German Flood” affected fewer people, both in 
absolute terms and relative to population, than the “Great Bangladeshi Flood” or the 
“Great Mozambican Flood.” Likewise, in Germany fewer than 50 people died, while in 
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both Bangladesh and Mozambique close to a thousand people died.  Germany is 
considered free, durable and stable while both Bangladesh and Mozambique experience 
constraints on democracy, some degree of political instability, and the current regime’s 
are young.  Comparing the differences in impact with differences in the political variables 
shows that the observed impact in these three countries is consistent with the three 
hypotheses.   
Indicative of a potential general trend is the observation that in all three of the 
countries some degree of democracy is associated with the political will of elites to 
respond to natural disasters.  But each of the two young unstable regimes suffered from a 
limited capacity to respond. 
 
Nicaragua and Honduras:  As democracy increases, disaster impact decreases. 
As neighboring Central American countries, Nicaragua and Honduras share exposure to 
similar natural hazards.  They also share a similar drive toward democratization during 
the last half century.  Though the following comparison is brief, these two countries, and 
others in the region, provide an excellent opportunity to investigate the links between 
political change and changes in the impact of natural disasters.  Comparing the change in 
democracy along with the change in relative disaster impact between these two countries, 
it is apparent that when democracy increases the impact of natural disasters decreases. 
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A context of change 
Examining figures 10-13, it is clear that both countries show a general upward 
trend in democracy as measured by their Polity score7 and a general downward trend in 
the relative impact of disasters as measured by the ratio of people killed to people 
affected.  Importantly, the two countries differ in their respective rate of change for these 
two variables.  Using the regression coefficient with time as the independent variable as a 
measure of the rate of change of these two variables for each country, Table 5 shows that 
the rate of change in relative disaster impact is greatest for Nicaragua where the rate of 
change of democracy was also greatest.   
 
 
Figures 10& 11:  Democracy in Honduras and Nicaragua 
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Figures 12 & 13:  Disaster Response in Honduras and Nicaragua 
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Table 5: Regression with Time as Independent Variable. 
 
 Polity  Killed/Affected  
Nicaragua .482 (±.024) -0.0012 (±.0003) 
Honduras .241 (±.016) -0.0004 (±.0001) 
 
 
Modeling Change with the Risk Equation 
 When viewed in a dynamic sense, the risk equation allows us to model and 
predict the change in risk as hazards, vulnerability and capability change.  While 
preliminary, the following analysis takes the observation of the previous sub-section one 
step closer to building an empirically verifiable, dynamic model of risk.8  Recall the risk 
equation 
  R = H x (V/C)            (i) 
which can be rearranged to yield 
  R/H = V/C.       (ii) 
In this formulation, the variable “Risk per Hazard” equals the variable “Vulnerability per 
Capability.”  Importantly, both quantities depend on time and using some basic 
assumptions, we can derive simple relations that allow us to compare observed changes 
in risk per hazard with democracy over time.  The first assumption is that risk per hazard 
trends linearly with time.  The second assumption is that vulnerability per capability is 
proportionally to the level of democracy of the country (P). The third assumption is that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 This commonly used measure of democracy is explained in more detail in the next chapter. 
8 For a more thorough qualitative discussion of the complex dynamics of hazard and risk see Pelling, Mark, 
Ed. Natural Disasters and Development in a Gobalizing World.  London: Routledge (2003.) 
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polity trends linearly with time.  Mathematically, these assumptions yield the following 
equations   
 R/H = a  + αt        (iii) 
V/C = χ x P        (iv) 
 P = b  + βt        (v) 
where α, β, and χ are unknown parameters.  While the last assumption is questionable in 
a general sense, it does appear valid for these two cases. Since R/H equals V/C, the time 
derivatives of these two variables are also equal.  Taking the time derivatives of the 
above equations yields 
  α = χ x β.       (vi) 
In order to develop this analysis further, a further set of assumptions is necessary.  
Equations (iii) and (v) above represent country specific dynamical processes, thus when 
comparing the evolution of R/H and P between two countries the coefficients in these 
equations would be different for the two countries.  In contrast, to the extend that 
equation (iv) represents a general rule of human behavior, we expect this coefficient will 
not change between countries.  Thus, the assumption that χHonduras = χNicaragua while 
αHonduras ≠ αNicaragua and βHonduras ≠ βNicaragua leads to the following relationship between the 
rate of change of R/H to the rate of change of P 
αH/αN = βH/βN .       (vii) 
Since a test of the above equation provides an indirect test of the assumptions upon which 
the equation rests, testing the hypothesis that these ratios are equal provides an indirect 
test that V/C depends on P. 
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Using the ratio of killed to affected is a valid indicator of risk per hazard, the 
ordinary least squares regression coefficients in Table 5 provide reliable  
estimates of α and β for Honduras and Nicaragua and allows for a basic test of the 
validity of the above hypothesis.  From Table 5, the ratio αH/αN =  .33(±.22)  while βH/βN 
= .50(±.06) where the errors are derived based on the assumption that the standard errors 
propagate linearly9. 
Since αH/αN is not significantly different from βH/βN, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that these ratios are equal nor can we reject the assumptions upon which this 
hypothesis is based.  While this analysis fails to control for other possible explanations of 
the approximate equalities of the two ratios, the finding is consistent with the notion of 
political vulnerability.  Though not possible at present, the next step in such a model 
would be to include terms for other sources of vulnerability in equation (iv).  Indeed, 
given the opportunity, one could follow these steps and use the risk equation to develop a 
fully dynamic model of vulnerability and risk. 
 
Sample Selection Rules and A Sample of Nine Countries. 
While the previous case studies focused on “telling the stories” that link political 
institutions with disaster response and disaster impact, the cases presented in this section 
follow a more rigorous case selection procedure which controls for the levels of 
development when associating disaster response with levels of democracy.  The findings 
based on 9 cases that as a whole span a large range of values of both development and  
                                                          
9 Let f = αH/αN and let ∆f equal the error in f.  The assumption that the standards errors in α (represented as 
∆α) propagate linear implies that f ± ∆f = (αH ± ∆αH) / ( αN ± ∆αN ).  After algebraic manipulation, this 
yields ∆f = (αH/αN) x [(1 ± ∆αH/αH)/ (1 ± ∆αN/αN) – 1], the equation used to estimate the uncertainty in the 
ratios. 
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Figure 14: Expected relationship between democracy, development, and disaster response 
(inside boxes.)   
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democracy demonstrate that some of the observed variance in disaster impact is better 
explained by variance in democracy than by variance in development.  As noted in 
Chapter 1, level of development is commonly associated with the level of disaster impact 
and disaster response.  In addition, in this chapter it was hypothesized that level of 
democracy also influences with the effectiveness of disaster response.  These two 
simultaneous hypotheses allows use to construct a 2 x 2 table that shows the expected 
disaster response as a function of both development and democracy.  A comparison of 
this expected 2 x 2 table with a 2 x 2 table of observed values tests the validity of the two 
hypotheses. 
The observed table is constructed using Human Development Index, the polity 
score and the ratio of people killed to people affected.  A composite index of a state’s 
level of income, education, and health care, the Human Development Index (HDI) 
published by the United Nations Development Program provides a standardized indicator 
of a state’s overall human development.  As before, the Polity Index is used to measure 
levels of democracy and the ratio of people killed to people affected is used to assess a 
state’s disaster response.  The data used here are from the year 2000. 
To obtain an adequate sample, the following case selection rules were applied in 
sequence: 
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1) A group of countries were chosen that are low in both democracy and human 
development. 
2) A group of countries were chosen such that their i) levels of democracy are 
approximately equal to the levels of democracy of the previously chosen group and ii) 
levels of human development where considerably higher. 
3) A group of countries were chosen that are i) comparatively high in democracy, but ii) 
similar to the first group with regard to level of human development. 
4) A group of countries were i) similar to the previous group in democracy, but ii) similar 
to the second group regarding development. 
These selection rules produced a sample of nine countries that range in 
democracy, development, and (importantly) effectiveness of disaster response.  For each 
of these cases the level of disaster response was calculated as the mean of the ratio of 
killed to affected for all events (for which data were available) in 2000.  Consistent with 
the hypothesis that democracy improves disaster response, for the countries with a high 
polity score the mean of killed to affected was low, while the countries with low 
democracy had a high mean ratio.  Contrary to the alternative hypothesis that 
development improves disaster response is the observation that the mean ratio did not 
increase with the HDI. 
Using the data in Table 6, it is possible to construct the observed 2 x 2 table for 
these countries.  Upon comparing it is clear that for this sample the ratio of people killed 
to people affected decreases as democracy increases, regardless of development.  Further, 
this table shows that for the sample the ratio of people killed to people affected increases 
with development, regardless of democracy.  This finding is consistent with the 
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Table 6:  Selected cases and indicator values.     
 Country Polity Score HDI Mean  (# of obs.) 
Philippines 8 .75 .009    (12) 
Brazil 8 .76 .001     (5) 
High 
Democracy 
High 
Development 
Panama 9 .78 .001      (1) 
Bangladesh 6 .47 .009    (10) 
Madagascar 7 .46    .00006      (3) 
High 
Democracy 
Low 
Development 
Botswana 9 .4    .00003      (1) 
Low 
Democracy 
High 
Development 
Saudi Arabia -10 .75 .288      (2) 
North Korea -9    LOW   (a) .014     (2) Low 
Democracy 
Low 
Development 
Sudan -7 .49 .066     (3) 
(a) Note: While the Human Development Index is not available for North Korea, it is well accepted that the 
country ranks low in all dimensions of the HDI. 
 
 
Figure 15:  Observed relationship between democracy, development, and disaster 
response. 
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hypothesis that democracy increases disaster response and is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that development increases disaster response. While a sample of only nine 
cases does not reveal any general trends, it does show that for some cases democracy 
provides the potential to explain variance in disaster response when development cannot. 
 
Conclusion 
While brief in nature, these case studies all tell a similar story:  when a regime is 
democratic, stable, and durable, their citizens are impacted less by natural disaster than 
when a regime is non-democratic, unstable, and/or young.  In other words, they all 
support the hypotheses presented at the end of chapter.  Naturally, one cannot draw 
general conclusions from a handful of case studies, and the next chapter demonstrate that 
the results of this chapter are indeed valid and generalizable.  
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Chapter 3: A statistical analysis of the political determinants of disaster impact    
 
Magnitude and frequency have little intrinsic meaning in such a context, unless  
they are tempered with some measure of human invulnerability and risk 
Alexander (2000) 
 
 When analyzing the political determinants of the impact of a natural disaster, 
there are a number of non-political factors to consider and control for.  While no perfect 
method exists to control for all of the possible factors that could and do contribute to the  
impact of natural disasters, this chapter presents a basic methodology for testing the 
validity and generalizability of the three hypotheses of Chapter 1.  From the risk 
equation, I develop a linear regression equation to model the socio-economic-political-
physical determinants of disaster impact.   
 In this chapter, I first return to the risk equation to develop a statistical model of 
the relative impact of natural disasters.  I then discuss the data and data sources.  Finally, 
I present the results of a regression of disaster impact with standard environmental, 
physical, social, economic, and political indicators.  This regression provides an estimate 
of the relative importance of these sources of vulnerability.  In the next chapter, I 
consider the reliability, validity, generalizability of the findings in Chapters 2 & 3 along 
with a brief discussion of policy implications.    
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A Model of Disaster, Disaster Response, and Disaster Impact 
Recall that the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction postulates the 
following relationship between risk (R), hazard (H), vulnerability (V), and capacity (C), 
R = H x (V/C)        (i) 
and further stipulates that V and C are dependent on a host of physical, social, economic 
and political factors.  In this equation, the variables V and C represent the “human” 
factors of risk, while H represents the “natural.”  Using this formulation as a starting 
point, I develop an analytical relation that can be tested using basic data on disasters, 
their impact, and the socio-economic-political context of the impacted area. 
As a basic research design assumption assume that the quantity V/C can be 
expressed as a function of physical (Ph), social (S), economic (E), and political (Po) 
variables. It then follows that R depends on Ph, S, E, and Po :  
R = H x V/C 
      = H x f(Ph, S, E, Po).      (ii) 
 This functional relation for R allows us to develop a statistical model for 
quantitatively analyzing the relationship between disasters, disaster impact, and the 
physical-social-political-economic context.  However, before delving into this analysis a 
basic reformulation is necessary to bridge the gap between definitions and data. 
 Importantly, risk is defined in terms of a probability that a destructive event will 
happen at some point in the future.  However, the available data (to be described shortly) 
provide information only on events that have happened in the past.  Thus, instead of 
talking about risk and hazards, we can talk about disasters (D), disaster response10 (Re), 
                                                          
10  This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 implying effective response and no actual impact and 1 
implying an ineffective response where the actual impact equals the full potential impact. 
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and disaster impact (I).  Similar to the above formulation for risk the impact of a natural 
disaster depends on the severity of disaster multiplied by a factor that represents the 
response.  Mathematically, 
I  = D x Re.        (iii)   
One way to think about this relationship is to imagine that a natural disaster can be 
characterized by its potential impact, represented by the variable D, which refers to its 
total potential to take lives, destroy homes, or damage economies.  However, the actual 
impact, represented by I, is only some fraction of the potential impact, where the 
response fraction equals Re.  In this sense, the “natural” factors of disaster impact are 
represented by D, while the “human” factors of disaster impact are represented by Re, 
and I equals the interaction of the two. 
As has been argued throughout this thesis, we expect that political institutions, to 
a large extent, either facilitate or hinder a country’s response to natural disasters.  And, as 
previous scholars have noted, physical, social and economic conditions also influence 
disaster response.  Thus, we have 
I = D x Re(Ph, S, E, Po)      (iv) 
which reflects equation (ii) above.  While the actual function in equation (iv) is unknown, 
a simple linear approximation to this equation provides a method for testing the three 
hypotheses.  Using the linear approximation of equation (iv), equation (iv) becomes 
I = D x (A  + B*Po + C1*Ph + C1*S+ C2*E)    (v) 
This model equation controls for the ecological (through the variable D), the physical, the 
social, and the economic sources of vulnerability and provides an indication of the 
relative importance of political vulnerability in contributing to I.       
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 Importantly, the application of equation (v) that follows rests on an important 
methodological decision – disasters as the unit-of-analysis.  In this study, the population 
consists of natural disasters, while the sample consists of the events that meet the 
selection criteria of the EM-DAT database for which all data points are available.  In 
contrast to this approach, typical comparative political science studies utilize the country 
or country-year as the unit-of-analysis.  Typically, these studies are interested in 
explaining some variable of interest that varies between country or country-years.  The 
present study, however, aims to explain a variable that is observed to vary between 
events.  While a study that employs the country-year as the unit of analysis would possess 
some benefits (especially in regards to policy analysis), such a study will have to wait 
until a standardized disaster vulnerability dataset that uses the country-year as the unit of 
analysis becomes available11.  In the meantime, this study rests on the implicit 
assumption that the available data provides an adequate random sample of the population 
of interest: natural disasters. 
 
EM-DAT:  The International Disasters Database 
The Center for Research in the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in 
collaboration with US OFDA and the Université catholique de Louvain in Brussels, 
Belgium provides a standardized, cross-national dataset for assessing disaster severity 
and impact.  According to the CRED website at www.cred.be/emdat, the Emergency 
                                                          
11 Such an approach with the present data would lead to a serious ambiguity: how to code countries or 
country-years where disasters that did not happen.  In this regard, a big distinction exists between years 
when disasters did not occur (zero killed and zero affected) and years when disasters did occur but did not 
take any lives (zero killed but some number affected.)  In this regard, the United Nations Development 
Program, as part of its disaster reduction initiatives, is working on a Global Risk-Vulnerability Index that 
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Events Database (EM-DAT) “contains essential core data on the occurrence and effects 
of over 12,800 mass disasters [over 8,000 of which are classified as natural disasters] in 
the world from 1900 to present. The database is compiled from various sources, including 
UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes 
and press agencies.”  Included as essential core data are the number of people affected 
and the number of people killed along with basic information such as type of disaster, 
country, date, etc.  While measurement issues are always a persistent problem in such an 
ambitious data collection project, this dataset has overcome a number of methodological 
issues related to cross-national standardization and possesses no clear political or 
ideological bias.  However, there may exist a bias toward more developed countries and 
more recent years due to better reporting of events.  
Using the database, one can construct a set of indicators that measures the impact 
of disasters and controls for many aspects of the disasters themselves. Conceptually, this 
data set will rest on the use of the number of people affected as a proxy measure for the 
disaster potential (viz. the hazard variable of the risk equation.)  While the type, strength, 
and location of the disaster are the three important characteristics that determine the 
disaster potential, the total number of people affected serves as a good proxy measure of 
these three characteristics.  Clearly, the number of people affected by the disaster will 
depend on the type, strength, and location of the disaster (see Appendix B for a partial 
justification of this assumption).  In addition, once nature determines the type, strength, 
and location of a disaster there is little that humans or governments can do to change the 
number of people that will be affected by the disaster.  For example, if a major hurricane 
                                                                                                                                                                             
will provide a quantitative comparison of risk and vulnerability between countries and over time.  For more 
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or earthquake is going to strike a major population center, the government can do nothing 
to change the number of people that lives in the affected area at the time of the disaster12.  
However, through disaster response, the government can influence the fraction of the 
affected people that are impacted (killed, left homeless, injured.) 
In addition to the number of people affected, the EM-DAT database provides a 
measure of the impact of disasters that are utilized here:  the number of people killed.  
However, unlike the number of people affected, this figure does not simply depend on 
nature alone.  While dependent on the type, strength, and location of the natural disaster, 
the number of lives lost also depends on the conditions of vulnerability and capability.  In 
other words, while disaster response cannot change the number of people affected, it can 
influence the number of people impacted.   
These measures provide standardized indicators of disaster impact and severity 
that apply across countries and disaster types.  While it is difficult to compare and 
quantify the impact of a hurricane in Cuba to the response to an epidemic in the Congo or 
to compare an earthquake in India with a flood in Bangladesh, the assumptions outlined 
above allows us to include all of these cases into a single dataset that includes 
quantitative measures of the disaster impact that applies across countries and across 
disaster types.  Naturally, such assumptions are always subject to criticism and 
skepticism, and, likewise, every research design possesses some limitations.  However, 
these indicators and this methodology do provide a solid foundation for testing the three 
                                                                                                                                                                             
information see http://www.undp.org/erd/disred/publications.htm.  
12 Though it is true that governments can exert an indirect influence over this variable through land-use 
planning and zoning. 
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hypotheses regarding the political determinants of disaster impact once an adequate set of 
independent and control indicators has been chosen. 
Finally, a few mathematical transformations improve and simplify the analysis. 
First, relative measures of severity and impact are preferred to absolute measures.  Thus, 
disaster impact is measured as the ratio of people killed to people impacted while severity 
is measured as the ratio of people affected to the total population of the impacted country.  
Next, taking the log transforms of these variables provided data that followed normal 
distributions.  Finally, using the identity log(x/y) = log(x) – log(y) to transform equation 
(v) above to  
log(I) = log(D) + (A  + B*Po + C1*Ph + C1*S+ C2*E)   (vi) 
which given the operationalization of I and D as relative indicators leads to  
 log(killed) = log(affected2/population) + (A  + B*Po + C1*Ph + C1*S+ C2*E)    (vii). 
 
Operationalization of the political variables. 
 Comparing these indicators of disaster impact to standard measures of level of 
democracy, regime durability, and political stability provides a test of the three 
hypotheses.  The Polity IV project provides Polity Index, which is a commonly used 
indicator of democracy, and the Durability Index, which measures durability as the 
number of years that the current regime has been in power.  The polity dataset along with 
the codebook and other information is on the internet at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/   
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The Banks Cross National Data Archive provides a domestic conflict index that 
measures political instability as a weighted sum of recorded number of events that 
indicate political instability.  The events used and their weight (in parentheses) in this 
index are as follows: the number of Assassinations (24), General Strikes (43), Guerrilla 
Warfare (46), Government Crises (48), Purges (86), Riots (102), Revolutions (148), Anti-
Government Demonstrations (200). 
Based on the findings in the literature review, we expect that these political 
variables will influence the effectiveness of a country’s response to natural disasters and 
reduced the observed impact.  In particular, the hypotheses predict that a regression with 
the number killed by the natural disaster as the dependent variable would have a negative 
coefficient for polity, a negative coefficient for durable, and a positive coefficient for 
instability.  
 
Operationalication of the control variables. 
 In addition to using indicators of the political institutions of a country, an 
adequate model of disaster response and impact must control for the physical, social and 
economic determinants.  A number of standard and commonly used indicators exist for 
these variables.  And, while one can write a long list of physical, social and economic 
indicators that likely correlate with the impact of natural disasters, I preserve the 
parsimony of the model by utilizing proxy indicators for each dimension of vulnerability.  
Although this technique glosses over many of the important social, economic, and 
physical processes that influence disaster response and impact, it helps keep the focus on 
the political processes that are the subject of this study.     
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The framework provided by the ISDR provides a set four conceptual variables 
and a list of potential indicators for each variable.  The framework, however, stops short 
of specifying the relative significance of each indicator.  More generally, the selection 
and weighting of indicators is a common problem in disaster research.  The regression 
below uses radios per capita as the indicator of physical vulnerability, population density 
as the indicator of social vulnerability, and the national government expenditure per 
capita as the economic indicator.  These indicators were chosen from the Banks Cross-
National Data Archive because they have the fewest missing cases.  Finally, each 
indicator was converted to a zero-to-one index where one indicates increased 
vulnerability.   
 
Table 7:  Codebook of indicators and source. 
Variable Indicator Source 
(Year of Release) 
Impact The log of the number of people killed by natural disaster. 
OFDA/CRED 
(2003) 
Severity The log of affected-squared divided by population. 
OFDA/CRED (2003), 
Banks (2000) 
Polity The combined democracy/ autocracy score (modified version.) 
Polity IV Project 
(2002) 
Durability The number of years since the most recent regime change. 
Polity IV Project 
(2002) 
Stability A weighted sum of the number of general strikes, guerrilla warfare, crises, purges, 
riots, revolutions, and anti-government 
demonstrations.  
Banks Cross National Data 
Archive 
(2000) 
Political Index Average of zero-to-one index of polity, durability, and stability. 
Polity IV (2002),  
Banks (2000) 
Physical Index Zero-to-one index of radios per capita.  Zero indicates more radios and lowered 
vulnerability. 
Banks Cross National Data 
Archive 
(2000) 
Economical Index Zero-to-one index of government expenditures per capita.  Zero indicates 
higher spending and lowered vulnerability. 
Banks Cross National Data 
Archive 
(2000) 
Social Index Zero-to-one index of population density. Zero indicates low population density and 
lowered vulnerability. 
Banks Cross National Data 
Archive 
(2000) 
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Regression results  
With this operationalization of the variables, the model equation, equation (vii), 
becomes the following regression equation: 
  log(killed)  = A + B1*polity + B2*durability + B3*stability + B4*participation  
+  C1*log(affected2/population) + C2*physical + C1*social  
+ C2*economic       (viii) 
In this regression equation, considering the factors of political vulnerability as individual 
terms allows us to test the three hypotheses of chapter 1 and while combining them into a 
single political index estimates the relative importance of political vulnerability. Thus, 
before analyzing the complete model above, two complementary regressions will 
demonstrate the importance of political vulnerability.   
 
Standard Model 
 The model of risk presented by the ISDR, what I term the Standard Model, posits 
that disaster risk depends on ecological, physical, economic, and social sources of 
vulnerability.  This model is operationalized in the following reduced form of the full  
regression equation above 
 log(killed)  = A +  C1*log(affected2/population) + C2*physical + C1*social  
+ C2*economic.        (ix) 
The results of this regression support the Standard Model, except that the economical 
index is not significant and overall R-squared is not very high.  Econometrically, this 
model suffers from heteroskedasticiy and omitted variable bias.  To compensate for these 
shortcomings, robust standard errors are presented. 
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Table 8:  The Standard Model of Disaster Vulnerability. 
 
n = 1525, F(4, 1520) = 94.24, R2 = 0.18  
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient Robust 
Standard  
Error 
t p > 
|t| 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Standardized 
Beta 
Coefficient  
Severity  .1128721 .0078542 14.37 0.000 (0.0974659, 
0.1282784) 
0.323099 
Physical  5.620112 1.322239 4.25 0.000 (3.026505, 
8.213719) 
0.1436598 
Economic 1.185378 .7616191 1.56 0.120 (-0.3085578, 
2.679313) 
0.0604141 
Social  .843245 .2668087 3.16 0.002 (0.3198928, 
1.366597) 
0.073491 
vif =1.50,    hettest =  10.58,      ovtest =  15.17  
 
Note:  vif, hettest, and ovtest refer to stata regression diagnostic commands for collinearity, 
heteroskedasticity, and omitted variable bias.  Generally speaking a value above 2.00 indicates that the 
sample fails to adequately follow the respective OLS assumption. 
 
 
The Standard+Political Model 
 To assess the relative importance of political vulnerability, a composite political 
index was calculated as the average of a zero-to-one index calculated from each of the 
three political variables. With the addition of the political index, the R-squared of the 
model is higher, an indication that this model offers a more complete explanation of the 
variance in the dependent variable.  The coefficient for the political vulnerability index is 
significant, and greater than the coefficients for social and economic vulnerability.  
However, like the above case this regression suffers from heteroskedasticity and omitted 
variable bias, though heteroskedasticity is lower than in the previous regression. 
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Table 9:  The Standard+Political model.   
   
N = 1515,  F(5, 1509) =  88.78, R2 = .19  
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient Robust 
Standard  
Error 
T p > 
|t| 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Standardized 
Beta 
Coefficient 
Severity  0.1145906 .0077953 14.70 0.000 (0.0992998, 
0.1298814) 
0.3291471 
Physical    5.585847 1.310963 4.26 0.000 (3.014344, 
8.157349) 
0.1435755 
Economic   0.9925324 .7716113 1.29 0.199 (-0.5210119, 
2.506077) 
0.0508974 
Social   0.5910399 .2703823 2.19 0.029 (0.0606749, 
1.121405) 
0.0517378 
Political  3.861908 .6471755 5.97 0.000 (2.592449, 
5.131367) 
0.1272318 
vif = 1.41,      hettest = 3.80,      ovtest = 15.74  
 
 
Table 10: Regression with polity, durability, and instability. 
N = 1493,  F(7, 1485) = 69.87, R2 = .21, vif = 1.82, hettest = 4.63, ovtest = 9.49 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient Robust 
Standard  
Error 
t p>|t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Standardized 
Beta 
Coefficient 
Severity   .1206591 .0077342 15.60 0.000 (0.1054879, 
0.1358302) 
0.3474491 
Physical 6.858652 1.718271 3.99 0.000 (3.488155, 
10.22915) 
0.1774148 
Economic .9577765 .7956066 1.20 0.229 (-0.6028557, 
2.518409) 
0.048793 
Social  .7648393 .2725263 2.81 0.005 (.230262, 
1.299417) 
0.0672458 
Polity -.0177468 .0069738 -2.54 0.011 (-0.0314264, -
0.0040672) 
-0.066906 
Durability   .0056841 .0023083 2.46 0.014 (.0011563, 
.0102119) 
0.0868271 
Instability .0000212 .00000386 5.49 0.000 (.0000136, 
.0000287) 
0.1231585 
   vif = 1.82,   hettest = 4.63,    ovtest = 9.49   
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Testing the Three Hypothesis 
In the complete regression equation (viii) the coefficients for polity, durability, 
and stability are all significant.  However, while polity and stability have the expected 
sign, the observed sign for durability is opposite from the expected.  This result indicates 
that the data support H1 and H3, but reject H2.  Again, the regression results are limited 
by heteroskedisticity and omitted variable bias. 
 
Statistical Simulation of Results 
 This section complements the presentation of regression results in the previous 
section by simulating the expected relationship between the number of people killed and 
each of the political indicators.  The simulations were done using the Clarify software 
package (Tomz, et al 2003, King et al 2000) that simulates standard regression results and 
calculates expected values of the dependent variable given values of each of the 
independent variables.  The tables below present simulated values of the number of 
people killed when all but one political variable is set to its mean value and the remaining 
political variable varies between its min and max.  The largest change is observed with 
instability; as the weighted conflict index varies between its max and min values, the 
number of killed varies between 5236 and 167.  In contrast, the predicted range of people 
killed with the polity variable is small and insignificant. 
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Figure 16: Expected value of people killed versus polity. 
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Figure 17: Expected value of people killed versus instability. 
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Figure 18: Expected value of people killed versus durable. 
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Conclusion 
 The first two regressions demonstrate that political vulnerability does matter, and 
indicates that is it is as important as physical vulnerability.  Comparing the R-squared of 
these two regressions shows that the model that includes a term for political vulnerability 
explains more of the variance in disaster impact than the model that excludes this term.  
Further, the coefficients of the four types of vulnerability in regression 2 suggest that 
physical and political vulnerability is more important than social and economic 
vulnerability. 
 Finally, in the third regression, we find evidence for hypothesis H1 and H2, and 
evidence against H3.  This regression shows that democracy, durability, and stability all 
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matter, but that the effect of durability is opposite of what was expected.  While H3 posits 
that the impact of natural disasters decreases as the government exists longer, the 
regression results indicate that the more durable the government, the higher the impact. 
 Simulations computed with the Clarify software show that political instability can 
have a very substantial impact of the number of people killed. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion   
 
The conventional wisdom holds that in addition to physical and environmental 
vulnerability, both economic and social vulnerability increase the threat and impact of 
natural hazards.  However, in developing this understanding of natural disasters, scholars 
failed to give sufficient attention to political vulnerability.  Previous studies, though 
informative, did not consider regime characteristics as potential determinants of the 
impact of natural hazards, and, as the results presented here indicate, missed an important 
dimension of human vulnerability to natural disasters.  
In addition to a number of case studies on this topic, one previously published 
large-N statistical study reported that politics does matter.  In fact, the study by Morris 
and Seitz indicates that for most disaster types, government instability matters more than 
the amount of available resources.  Their model does not include a term to control for the 
severity of the disaster.  In the present study, this result is strengthened by the inclusion 
of a term for the relative strength of the disaster.  Likewise, the generalizability of 
previous studies is extended through both the case studies and the large sample used in 
the statistical analysis.   
 
Summary of Findings 
Utilizing and extending the framework of analysis presented by International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction, this thesis finds strong support for the notion that 
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political vulnerability, like physical, economic, and social vulnerability, increases the risk 
and the associated impact of natural hazards.  The first, third, and fourth case studies all 
support H1, which relates the level of democracy to the impact of natural disasters.  
Likewise, the regression results indicate that this hypothesis is valid for a large number of 
disasters.  Regarding H2, the hypothesis that political instability increases the impact of 
natural disasters, the second case study provides limited support while the statistical 
analysis finds strong support.  Finally, regarding H3, which posits that natural disaster 
impact decreases as a regime becomes more durable, the statistical analysis rejects this 
hypothesis and finds that the impact of natural disasters actually increases with the 
durability of the regime.   
        
Assessment of Results 
 In order to confidently infer a cause-effect relationship between two variables that 
are observed to be significantly associated, Hennekens and Buring suggest the following 
criteria for assessing a hypothesis (Hennekens and Buring 1987, p. 39):  
 a) Strength of the association 
 b) Theoretical credibility13  
 c) Consistency with other investigations 
 d) Time sequence 
e) Observed policy implications14 
In this regard the regression results indicate a strong association between political 
regime characteristics and disaster impact.  However, this result is subject to many types 
                                                          
13 While the authors of this text on Epidemiology use the term “Biologic Credibility” the term “Theoretical 
Credibility” is taken to imply the same idea but applicable to the present context.   
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of bias.  Seitz and Morris note that the over-identification of disasters in the developed 
world and the under-identification of disasters in the undeveloped world biases disaster 
data (Davis and Seitz 1982, p. 552.)  In addition, they write “disasters that may have 
occurred under close-mouthed regimes … go underreported.”  (Davis and Seitz 1982, p. 
554.)  Likewise, the indicators of social, economic, and physical vulnerability can be 
improved by including different aspects of these factors of vulnerability.  Finally, from an 
econometric standpoint, the regression diagnostics indicate that the model is not specified 
completely leading to the possibility of biased and inconsistent coefficients.  Thus, an 
important next direction for research in this area is the identification and inclusion of the 
omitted variable(s) (see the end of Appendix C.)  However, even this model does no 
completely cover the large number of actors involved in disaster response.        
The theoretical credibility of such a cause-effect relationship is established in both 
the previous research and the present work.  While previous studies, for example Living 
with Risk, are consistent with the notion of political vulnerability to natural disasters, the 
inclusion of political will and state capability as intervening variables provides a solid 
conceptual link between political institutions and the impact of natural disasters.  
However, the theory presented thus far suffers from an endogeneity problem.  In 
particular, just as we expect the underlying social-political-economic conditions to 
influence the impact of a natural disaster, we should also expect the impact of a natural 
disaster to influence the underlying social-political-economic conditions of the affected 
area.  Thus, building on Chart 4, Chart 6 offers a more complete model that includes the 
impact of natural disasters on the underlying human and environmental conditions.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 This term is used in substitution for the term “Dose-response relationship” found in the text. 
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Figure 19:  A more complete model of natural disasters. 
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             In addition to a great deal of consistency between the case studies and regression 
analysis, the results presented here are consistent with previously reported findings, 
including the study by Seitz and Morris.  Likewise, the observation by Wisner and Rocha 
& Christoplos that El Salvador and Nicaragua did not learn from Hurricane Mitch agrees 
with the findings regarding H2, the institutional learning hypothesis.  Further, the 
theoretical argument for associating disaster impact with political institutions is 
consistent with both the political-economy of Lake & Baum and the risk framework by 
the ISDR.      
 This thesis, however, does not present a rigorous time-series analysis that 
associates change in disaster impact with change in political institutions.  The third case 
study, which does examine change of these variables in Nicaragua and Honduras, is only 
an initial step in this direction.  Using the risk equation to develop a model of change in 
vulnerability and risk and verifying such a model with times-series analysis is an 
important next step in research on disasters and their social-economic-political context.     
 Likewise, as the present focus is limited to the overall political context of natural 
disasters, it does not examine the implications of specific policy changes at the local, 
national or international level.  Complementary to a large-N time series analysis, case 
studies that link changes in policy (and more importantly, the policymaking environment) 
with disaster impact is another important area of research that should be pursued. 
 
Implications 
While the findings of this study do possess some limitations, it is not likely that 
these shortcomings will change the overall conclusion that political vulnerability is an 
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important source of risk and has a real influence on the impact of disasters.  Clearly, for 
disaster victims around the world, level of democracy, regime durability, and political 
stability all affect the chances of survival.  The implications of this finding are both 
theoretical and practical.   
From a theoretical standpoint, scholars who look beyond the normative and 
ideological aspects of domestic political-economy have examined the observed impact of 
political institutions on many aspects of daily life.  For example, Lake & Baum have 
assessed the impact of democracy on economic growth, public health, and education and 
found that this regime characteristic impacts each of these quality-of-life issues.  In a 
similar manner, the results here show that regime characteristics matter in another 
important quality-of-life issue: the impact of natural disasters. 
Viewing the state as a rational, self-interested actor that varies only in its domestic 
policy making environment, it was predicted that democratic, stable, and durable regimes 
would provide better protection to their citizens during a natural disaster.  While the 
results show that each of these variables matters, only democracy and stability were 
observed to matter in the predicted direction.  Two possible reasons may explain the 
discrepant finding.  First, as they exist longer and become more established, regimes may 
grow less concerned with legitimacy and become lazy when it comes to protecting 
citizens.  Or, secondly, the rational, self-interested state may over time learn that disaster 
response does not provide as good of an investment return as other public service 
provisions, like public health or education, and may hence spend more on these services 
at the expense of disaster response.   
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From a policy perspective, two points are important.  First, relief workers and 
planners need to take the political vulnerability of a country into consideration when 
assessing vulnerability and planning for disasters.  Unfortunately, when a country is non-
democratic and politically unstable more people go unprotected.  Secondly, this raises the 
question of political reform as a viable disaster reduction strategy.  Should organizations 
such as CARE, International and The International Federation of the Red Cross adopt an 
active policy of encouraging democracy as a means of reducing the impact of natural 
disasters?  Naturally, more research is required before such a policy option is considered 
feasible.  However, this research does suggest international assistance geared toward 
developing democratic and stable political regimes will decrease a country’s vulnerability 
toward natural disasters.  
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Appendix A:  The EM-DAT dataset and some basic stats on disasters   
 A reported disaster is included in the EM-DAT dataset if a) ten or more people die as a result of 
the disaster, b) 100 or more people are affected/injured/homeless, or c) the impacted country declares a 
state of emergency or appeals for international aid.  The dataset is updated regularly (every three months) 
as new data become available.  This thesis uses the May 2003 release of the dataset that includes data on 
over 8,800 natural disasters that have occurred between 1900-2002.  The tables below provide a broad 
summary of the disaster recorded in the EM-DAT dataset.    
 
Table 11:  Number of recorded events by disaster type 
Disaster Type Number of Occurrences Percent of Total 
Drought 782 8.87 
Earthquake 900 10.21 
Epidemic 854 9.69 
Extreme temperature 263 2.98 
Famine 77 0.87 
Flood 2390 27.11 
Insect infestation 672 0.82 
Slide 449 5.09 
Volcano 169 1.92 
Wave/surge 41 0.47 
Wild fire 270 3.06 
Wind storm 2548 28.91 
 
Table 12:  Recorded disasters by continent. 
Continent Number of Occurrences Percent of Total 
Africa 1650 18.72 
Americas 2258 25.62 
Asia 3286 37.29 
Europe 1185 13.45 
Oceania 433 4.91 
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Table 13:  Summary of disaster impact variables. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Killed 7610 8153.451 253150.9 0 2.00e+07 
Injured 3372 1102.756 13952.1 0 600000 
Homeless 3131 62822.23 836215.8 0 2.80e+07 
Affected 4841 1094744 1.01e+07 0 3.00e+08 
Damage 
($1,000’s) 
2548 393320.6 2998802 0 1.32e+08 
Killed/Affected 3944 .054117 .4431987 0 16 
Damage/Affected 1496 48.73114 439.6103 6.75e-6 10000 
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Appendix B:  Validity of research design assumption   
This appendix focuses on the relationship between the disaster impact and the magnitude of the 
disaster.  In addition to the disaster impact indicators the CRED database contains the following measures 
of disaster type and magnitude: disaster type, disaster subset, disaster scale, and disaster scale value.  For a 
given type of disaster, the disaster scale value gives the relative magnitude of each disaster while the 
disaster scale variable gives the units for that disaster type.  For example, the disaster scale for earthquakes 
is the Richter and the disaster scale value ranges from 3.5 to 10.0.   
 
Table 14:  Summary of disaster scale value by type. 
Disaster 
Type 
Disaster 
Scale 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean    Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Drought km2 58 52696.6 110666.5 1 560000 
Earthquake Richter 598 6.357274 .9261336 3.5 9.5 
Epidemic vaccinated 18 972155.9 1854006 6000 7500000 
Flood km2 358 56530.16 742576.7 .38 1.40e+07 
Wildfire km2 148 15892.71 120007.1 1.3 1294994 
Windstorm kph 545 620.9431 9944.432 20 232000 
Cold Wave °C 58 18.55172 16.37054 -60 7 
Heat Wave °C 41 44.19512 6.063537 30 60 
 
A central assumption of the research design is that the number of people affected by the disaster serves as a 
proxy measure for the severity of the disaster.  In otherwords, while a 6.7 on the Richter scale cannot be 
compared to 190 kph, the number of people affected is a measure of magnitude that is comparable between 
earthquakes and windstorms.  Below I present the results of a bivariate correlation analysis of the different 
disaster impact parameters with the disaster scale value.  For drought, epidemic, and flood there is a strong 
and significant correlation between the number of people affected and disaster scale value.  This finding 
suggests that the number of people affected does provide a valid measure for the magnitude of the disaster.   
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Table 15:  Correlation between disaster magnitude and disaster impact. 
Correlation Coefficient between Disaster Scale Value and  
Disaster 
Type 
Affected Total 
Affected 
Killed Injured Homeless Damage 
Drought 0.7015 
 (0.000) 
0.7015  
(0.000) 
0.0896    
(0.5538) 
  0.1961      
(0.3370)   
Earthquake 0.1384   
(0.0059) 
0.1079   
(0.0107) 
0.2488   
(0.0000) 
0.2495      
(0.0000) 
0.2107   
(0.0001) 
0.0879   
(0.1554) 
Epidemic 0.5505   
(0.0179) 
0.5505   
(0.0179) 
0.6055   
(0.0078) 
   
Flood  0.4290   
(0.0000) 
0.4179   
(0.0000) 
0.0243   
(0.6528) 
0.6308   
(0.0000) 
0.1034   
(0.0955) 
0.3324     
(0.0000) 
Wildfire -0.0207   
(0.8689) 
-0.0220      
(0.8507) 
0.2868  
(0.0024) 
-0.0337      
(0.8241) 
-0.0713   
(0.6706) 
0.0336      
(0.8458) 
Windstorm 0.0276   
(0.6008) 
0.0397   
(0.4174) 
0.0566   
(0.1992) 
0.0667      
(0.2361) 
0.0899   
(0.1291) 
0.0818   
(0.1931) 
Cold Wave -0.4037   
(0.0695) 
-0.3713   
(0.0811) 
0.2237  
(0.1040) 
0.2986    
(0.2444) 
 -0.9926      
(0.0074) 
Heat Wave 0.0302     
(0.9220) 
0.0428   
(0.8748) 
0.2666  
(0.1107) 
-0.0609  
(0.8292) 
 -0.8023      
(0.4073) 
 
Regarding windstorms two comments are in order.  This disaster type includes both tornadoes and 
hurricanes and they should be considered separately. Further, other researchers have found a correlation 
between El-Nino activity (particularly increased number of windstorms) and the number of people affected 
by natural disasters (Bourma 1997, p. 1435.)   
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Appendix C:  The regression analysis        
This appendix presents the complete regression analysis that lead to the regression presented in the text.   
To a large extent, this appendix fills in the gaps left by the theory.  For example, the accepted theory tells 
us that social and economic vulnerability is important, it does not tell how to operationalize these variables.  
More generally, the issue of indicator selection and weighting remains unresolved. 
 
The goal of this appendix is to find a regression result that includes a large number of cases, produces 
results that are robust, and passes the important econometric diagnostics.  The constraint is data 
availability.  Finally, the method is inductive in nature. 
 
All statistical calculations presented below were made using the STATA software package. 
 
 
First determine best indicator of severity 
 
From a numerical standpoint, numerous combinations of affected and population provide a measure of the 
severity of disaster.  I use the data to distinguish between the possibilities.  In particular, I consider 
bivariate regressions with log(killed) as the dependent variable and the possible measures of severity as the 
independent variables.  Below I list the indicator of severity along with the r-squared of the corresponding 
regression: 
 
Log(affected/population)  0.10 
Log(affected^2/population)  0.15 
Log(affected/population^2) 0.03 
Log(affected^2/population^2) 0.10 
 
Since log(affected^2/population) explains the largest portion of the dependent variable, it is the best 
indicator of disaster severity. 
 
 
Selecting Indicators through Data Availability 
 
The most basic method of indicator selection is to follow the data.  While the Banks Data Archive includes 
many variables and many country-years, it also includes many missing values.  In the following set of 
regressions, I calculate the social, economic, and physical indexes based on the chosen by the number of 
available data points.  I start with a single indicator for each index, then I add a second indicator to each 
index, and then a third. 
 
The following disasters were identified as outliers (high residuals following regression) causing extreme 
heteroskedasticity and removed from the sample (listed in order of residual-squared with highest first): 
 
 
Note that: 
kil_aff = killed/affected 
aff_pop = affected/population 
 
  countryyear           distype        killed      affected    kil_aff    aff_pop 
6948.    Soviet Union1921       Drought       1200000       5000000        .24   .0362745 
2411.    Ethiopia1984           Drought        300000       7750000   .0387097   .1837843 
3265.    India1965              Drought        500000     100000000       .005   .2054865 
4001.    Iran, Islam Rep1990    Earthquake      40000        500000        .08    .009175 
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1949.    Colombia1985           Volcano         22800         50000       .456    .001696 
2398.    Ethiopia1973           Drought        100000       3000000   .0333333   .1150307 
640.     Bangladesh1991         Wind storm     138866      15000000   .0092577   .1345835 
6025.    Peru1970               Earthquake      66794       3072909   .0217364    .226182 
 
 
Comparing these figures to the summary statistics of the entire sample shows that most of these cases are 
extreme cases in terms of these key disaster variables: 
 
 
    Variable |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------- 
      killed |    7610    8153.451   253150.9          0   2.00e+07 
    affected |    4841     1094744   1.01e+07          0   3.00e+08 
     kil_aff |    3944     .054117   .4431987          0         16 
     aff_pop |    3403    .0246749    .095489          0   1.229508 
 
 
Regression #1:  Single Indicators 
 
Social:  population density  
Economic: national government expenditure per capita  
Physical:  radios per capita  
 
Here is the regression along with the diagnostics: 
 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1525 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,  1520) =   81.68 
       Model |  1063.90233     4  265.975582           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4949.34105  1520  3.25614543           R-squared     =  0.1769 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1748 
       Total |  6013.24338  1524  3.94569776           Root MSE      =  1.8045 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1128721   .0083175    13.57   0.000     .0965572    .1291871 
         phy |   5.620112   1.280532     4.39   0.000     3.108316    8.131908 
         eco |   1.185378   .6377769     1.86   0.063     -.065638    2.436394 
         soc |    .843245   .2692437     3.13   0.002     .3151164    1.371373 
       _cons |  -4.078444   .9152186    -4.46   0.000    -5.873669   -2.283219 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Regression #2:  Two Indicators 
 
In this regression, each of the vulnerability indexes are calculated as an average of two indicators.  The 
composite indexes now represent the follow: 
 
Social:  population density, daily newspaper circulation per capita    (soc) 
Economic: national government expenditure per capita, gross national product    (eco) 
Physical:  radios per capita, highway vehicles per capita    (phy) 
 
In this regression, collinearity is present: 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1268 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,  1263) =   62.66 
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       Model |  836.664377     4  209.166094           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4216.19496  1263  3.33823829           R-squared     =  0.1656 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1629 
       Total |  5052.85934  1267  3.98804999           Root MSE      =  1.8271 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1103175   .0093379    11.81   0.000     .0919979    .1286371 
         phy |   3.052072   .9504118     3.21   0.001     1.187513    4.916632 
         eco |  -.0650987   1.161948    -0.06   0.955    -2.344659    2.214461 
         soc |   .4968848   .5316912     0.93   0.350    -.5462104     1.53998 
       _cons |  -.4028557   .5544457    -0.73   0.468    -1.490592    .6848803 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      5.04    0.198401 
         eco |      4.41    0.226690 
         soc |      1.49    0.671313 
 log_aff2pop |      1.06    0.946573 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      3.00 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =     14.14 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.0002 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(3, 1260) =     16.13 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
Regression #3:  Three Indicators 
 
Finally, a third indicator was included in each index to make them composite indexes of the following: 
 
Social:  population density, daily newspaper circulation per capita, primary school enrollment (socb) 
Economic: national government expenditure per capita, gnp per capita, gnp per capita     (ecob) 
Physical:  radios per capita, highway vehicles per capita, size of military   (phyb) 
 
While the diagnostics of this regression are relatively good, the sample is limited to only 518 cases from 
years before 1982 and heavily concentrated in a brief timespan: 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phyb ecob socb 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     518 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,   513) =   33.19 
       Model |   452.90861     4  113.227152           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1750.14076   513  3.41158043           R-squared     =  0.2056 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1994 
       Total |  2203.04937   517  4.26121735           Root MSE      =   1.847 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1501588   .0145833    10.30   0.000     .1215084    .1788092 
        phyb |  -1.274825    1.61385    -0.79   0.430    -4.445392    1.895743 
        ecob |   2.300495   2.398026     0.96   0.338    -2.410664    7.011655 
        socb |   3.598323   1.261277     2.85   0.005     1.120419    6.076227 
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       _cons |  -.5371562   1.479648    -0.36   0.717    -3.444072    2.369759 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
        ecob |      2.57    0.388782 
        phyb |      2.42    0.413316 
        socb |      1.33    0.749684 
 log_aff2pop |      1.05    0.953488 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.84 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =     10.39 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.0013 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 510) =      4.09 
                  Prob > F =      0.0069 
 
. tab year if yhat ~= . 
 
       year |      Freq.     Percent          
------------+---------------------------- 
       1949 |          2        0.27          
       1950 |          2        0.27          
       1952 |          2        0.27          
       1953 |          6        0.82          
       1954 |          2        0.27          
       1956 |          1        0.14          
       1957 |          4        0.54          
       1958 |          2        0.27          
       1959 |          2        0.27          
       1960 |          2        0.27          
       1961 |          1        0.14          
       1962 |          2        0.27          
       1963 |          7        0.95          
       1964 |         32        4.36          
       1965 |         28        3.81         
       1966 |         38        5.18         
       1967 |         42        5.72         
       1968 |         42        5.72         
       1969 |         33        4.50         
       1970 |         38        5.18         
       1971 |         31        4.22         
       1972 |         26        3.54         
       1973 |         26        3.54         
       1974 |         27        3.68         
       1975 |         16        2.18         
       1976 |         35        4.77         
       1977 |         77       10.49         
       1978 |         76       10.35         
       1979 |         63        8.58         
       1980 |         65        8.86         
       1981 |          3        0.41        
       1982 |          1        0.14        
------------+----------------------------    
      Total |        734      100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 88
Regression #4:  Hybrid 
 
To eliminate the colinearity of the regression #2, the following regression includes two-indicator composite 
index for social and physical vulnerability, but only one indicator for economic vulnerability: 
 
Social:  population density, daily newspaper circulation per capita    (soc) 
Economic: national government expenditure per capita       (eco1) 
Physical:  radios per capita, highway vehicles per capita    (phy)  
 
This sample includes over 1300 cases, but suffers from heteroskedasticity and omitted variable bias: 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco1 soc 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1356 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,  1351) =   67.71 
       Model |  903.226796     4  225.806699           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |    4505.635  1351  3.33503701           R-squared     =  0.1670 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1645 
       Total |   5408.8618  1355  3.99177993           Root MSE      =  1.8262 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1108477   .0090712    12.22   0.000     .0930526    .1286429 
         phy |   2.636099   .6474382     4.07   0.000     1.366006    3.906192 
        eco1 |   .5094643   .9021742     0.56   0.572     -1.26035    2.279279 
         soc |   .6942378   .4985932     1.39   0.164    -.2838631    1.672339 
       _cons |  -.7093045   .6096939    -1.16   0.245    -1.905354    .4867451 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      2.65    0.377290 
        eco1 |      2.13    0.469432 
         soc |      1.48    0.676711 
 log_aff2pop |      1.05    0.949850 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.83 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =     14.30 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.0002 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(3, 1348) =     17.09 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
Upon comparison, regression #1 possesses the most statistical strength.  While heteroskedasticity and 
omitted variable bias is a problem with each of these regressions, it appears least severe in this regression.  
Further, this regression includes the most cases and has the highest adjusted r-squared. 
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The Political Model 
 
 
Regression #5:  Inclusion of the composite political index. 
 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc pol 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1515 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,  1509) =   72.03 
       Model |  1143.49442     5  228.698885           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4791.27813  1509  3.17513461           R-squared     =  0.1927 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1900 
       Total |  5934.77255  1514  3.91992903           Root MSE      =  1.7819 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1145906   .0082511    13.89   0.000     .0984057    .1307754 
         phy |   5.585847   1.265533     4.41   0.000     3.103456    8.068237 
         eco |   .9925324   .6310214     1.57   0.116    -.2452395    2.230304 
         soc |   .5910399   .2702578     2.19   0.029      .060919    1.121161 
         pol |   3.861908   .7144891     5.41   0.000     2.460411    5.263405 
       _cons |  -4.002774   .9046295    -4.42   0.000    -5.777238    -2.22831 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Regression #6: Testing democracy, durability, and stability 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 durable weighted 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1493 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,  1485) =   55.33 
       Model |  1201.61117     7  171.658738           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4607.40481  1485   3.1026295           R-squared     =  0.2069 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2031 
       Total |  5809.01597  1492  3.89344234           Root MSE      =  1.7614 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1206591   .0082485    14.63   0.000     .1044792     .136839 
         phy |   6.858652   1.745602     3.93   0.000     3.434544    10.28276 
         eco |   .9577765   .6414705     1.49   0.136    -.3005081    2.216061 
         soc |   .7648393   .2724744     2.81   0.005     .2303637    1.299315 
     polity2 |  -.0177468   .0068689    -2.58   0.010    -.0312206   -.0042729 
     durable |   .0056841   .0023644     2.40   0.016     .0010462     .010322 
weightedco~x |   .0000212   4.11e-06     5.15   0.000     .0000131    .0000292 
       _cons |  -5.356668   1.483022    -3.61   0.000    -8.265708   -2.447629 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      3.82    0.261960 
     durable |      2.44    0.409443 
         eco |      2.00    0.500136 
     polity2 |      1.26    0.796449 
         soc |      1.07    0.930649 
weightedco~x |      1.07    0.933871 
 log_aff2pop |      1.06    0.946709 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.82 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
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     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =      4.63 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.0314 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(3, 1482) =      9.49 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
 
In Both heteroskedasticiy and omitted variable bias are present in these regressions (for brevities sake I 
present the diagnostics of just the last one) and may impact the estimate of the standard errors: 
 
 
However, when using robust standard errors the results do not change: 
 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc, robust  
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =    1525 
                                                       F(  4,  1520) =   94.24 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1769 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.8045 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1128721   .0078542    14.37   0.000     .0974659    .1282784 
         phy |   5.620112   1.322239     4.25   0.000     3.026505    8.213719 
         eco |   1.185378   .7616191     1.56   0.120    -.3085578    2.679313 
         soc |    .843245   .2668087     3.16   0.002     .3198928    1.366597 
       _cons |  -4.078444   .8792989    -4.64   0.000    -5.803211   -2.353676 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
  
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc pol, robust  
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =    1515 
                                                       F(  5,  1509) =   88.78 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1927 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.7819 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1145906   .0077953    14.70   0.000     .0992998    .1298814 
         phy |   5.585847   1.310963     4.26   0.000     3.014344    8.157349 
         eco |   .9925324   .7716113     1.29   0.199    -.5210119    2.506077 
         soc |   .5910399   .2703823     2.19   0.029     .0606749    1.121405 
         pol |   3.861908   .6471755     5.97   0.000     2.592449    5.131367 
       _cons |  -4.002774   .8658775    -4.62   0.000    -5.701225   -2.304323 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 durable weighted, robust 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =    1493 
                                                       F(  7,  1485) =   69.87 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
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                                                       R-squared     =  0.2069 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.7614 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1206591   .0077342    15.60   0.000     .1054879    .1358302 
         phy |   6.858652   1.718271     3.99   0.000     3.488155    10.22915 
         eco |   .9577765   .7956066     1.20   0.229    -.6028557    2.518409 
         soc |   .7648393   .2725263     2.81   0.005      .230262    1.299417 
     polity2 |  -.0177468   .0069738    -2.54   0.011    -.0314264   -.0040672 
     durable |   .0056841   .0023083     2.46   0.014     .0011563    .0102119 
weightedco~x |   .0000212   3.86e-06     5.49   0.000     .0000136    .0000287 
       _cons |  -5.356668   1.402128    -3.82   0.000     -8.10703   -2.606307 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Finally, to facilitate better substantive interpretation of these results, I regress using beta coefficients 
instead of regular coefficients.  As opposed to the regular coefficient, which is interpreted as the impact of 
a one-unit change in the independent variable, the beta coefficients are interpreted as the impact of a one-
standard deviation change in the independent variable.  Beta coefficients are easy to compare and aid in 
assessing the relative impact of the different variables. 
 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc, beta 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1525 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,  1520) =   81.68 
       Model |  1063.90229     4  265.975571           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4949.34109  1520  3.25614546           R-squared     =  0.1769 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1748 
       Total |  6013.24338  1524  3.94569776           Root MSE      =  1.8045 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1128721   .0083175    13.57   0.000                  .323099 
         phy |   5.620112   1.280532     4.39   0.000                 .1436598 
         eco |   1.185378   .6377769     1.86   0.063                 .0604141 
         soc |   .8432449   .2692437     3.13   0.002                  .073491 
       _cons |  -4.078444   .9152186    -4.46   0.000                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc pol, beta 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1515 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,  1509) =   72.03 
       Model |  1143.49437     5  228.698874           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4791.27818  1509  3.17513465           R-squared     =  0.1927 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1900 
       Total |  5934.77255  1514  3.91992903           Root MSE      =  1.7819 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1145906   .0082511    13.89   0.000                 .3291471 
         phy |   5.585847   1.265533     4.41   0.000                 .1435755 
         eco |   .9925325   .6310214     1.57   0.116                 .0508974 
         soc |   .5910398   .2702578     2.19   0.029                 .0517378 
         pol |   3.861908   .7144892     5.41   0.000                 .1272318 
       _cons |  -4.002774   .9046295    -4.42   0.000                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable, beta 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1493 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,  1485) =   55.33 
       Model |  1201.61112     7  171.658732           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4607.40485  1485  3.10262953           R-squared     =  0.2069 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2031 
       Total |  5809.01597  1492  3.89344234           Root MSE      =  1.7614 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1206591   .0082485    14.63   0.000                 .3474491 
         phy |   6.858652   1.745602     3.93   0.000                 .1774148 
         eco |   .9577765   .6414705     1.49   0.136                  .048793 
         soc |   .7648392   .2724744     2.81   0.005                 .0672458 
     polity2 |  -.0177468   .0068689    -2.58   0.010                 -.066906 
weightedco~x |   .0000212   4.11e-06     5.15   0.000                 .1231585 
     durable |   .0056841   .0023644     2.40   0.016                 .0868271 
       _cons |  -5.356668   1.483022    -3.61   0.000                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
The Regression Sample 
 
The following figures describe the sample that was used in this regression: 
 
 
       distype |      Freq.     Percent         
-------------------+--------------------------  
           Drought |         13        0.87          
        Earthquake |        199       13.33         
          Epidemic |        166       11.12         
      Extreme temp |          7        0.47         
            Famine |          4        0.27         
             Flood |        584       39.12         
             Slide |         50        3.35         
           Volcano |         28        1.88         
        Wave/surge |          1        0.07         
         Wild fire |         10        0.67         
        Wind storm |        431       28.87        
-------------------+-------------------------- 
             Total |       1493      100.00 
 
 
 
  continent |      Freq.     Percent          
 -----------+--------------------------  
     Africa |        181       12.12         
   Americas |        358       23.98         
       Asia |        800       53.58         
     Europe |        110        7.37         
    Oceania |         44        2.95        
------------+--------------------------  
      Total |       1493      100.00 
 
 
 
 
The regression sample covers the year 1949-95.  However, the later years are over represented: 
 
 
       year |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
       1949 |          1        0.07        0.07 
       1950 |          1        0.07        0.13 
       1951 |          1        0.07        0.20 
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       1953 |          6        0.40        0.60 
       1954 |          2        0.13        0.74 
       1957 |          4        0.27        1.00 
       1958 |          1        0.07        1.07 
       1959 |          2        0.13        1.21 
       1960 |          4        0.27        1.47 
       1961 |          1        0.07        1.54 
       1962 |          1        0.07        1.61 
       1963 |          4        0.27        1.88 
       1964 |         18        1.21        3.08 
       1965 |         21        1.41        4.49 
       1966 |         32        2.14        6.63 
       1967 |         32        2.14        8.77 
       1968 |         32        2.14       10.92 
       1969 |         27        1.81       12.73 
       1970 |         30        2.01       14.74 
       1971 |         12        0.80       15.54 
       1972 |         20        1.34       16.88 
       1973 |         17        1.14       18.02 
       1974 |         23        1.54       19.56 
       1975 |         15        1.00       20.56 
       1976 |         30        2.01       22.57 
       1977 |         51        3.42       25.99 
       1978 |         53        3.55       29.54 
       1979 |         46        3.08       32.62 
       1980 |         45        3.01       35.63 
       1981 |         43        2.88       38.51 
       1982 |         48        3.22       41.73 
       1983 |         53        3.55       45.28 
       1984 |         43        2.88       48.16 
       1985 |         57        3.82       51.98 
       1986 |         64        4.29       56.26 
       1987 |         70        4.69       60.95 
       1988 |         72        4.82       65.77 
       1989 |         51        3.42       69.19 
       1990 |         47        3.15       72.34 
       1991 |         87        5.83       78.16 
       1992 |         50        3.35       81.51 
       1993 |         92        6.16       87.68 
       1994 |         87        5.83       93.50 
       1995 |         97        6.50      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |       1493      100.00 
 
 
Regression Sub-Samples 
Calculating the regression coefficients for different sub-samples provides an indication of the different 
domains where the model best applies, and can provide some insight on the missing variables of the model.  
In particular, the regression can be broken into sub-samples based on disaster type, continent, and time 
period.  To a large extent, the regression results do not change in a significant manner for the samples. 
However, looking at the restricted domain of disasters in Asia between 1970 and 1990 produced regression 
results that passed the three important diagnostic tests. 
 
Below I present regression results for the sub-samples that exist with n > 30.  Thus, for example, a sub-
sample of all recorded droughts for which data on all the variables exist (n = 13) is omitted. 
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Disaster type 
 
 
The model explains windstorms (R^2 = .29) and epidemics (R^2 = .40) best.  For epidemics, polity and the 
conflict index are significant and in the expected direction.  None of the other vulnerability variables are 
significant.  For windstorms, the physical and social indexes are significant and in the expected direction.  
Slides produced the worst goodness-of-fit.  No significant difference is observed for any of the sub-samples 
based on disaster type.  
 
 
 
 
Earthquakes 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if distype 
=="Earthquake", beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     199 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   191) =   11.23 
       Model |  388.554189     7  55.5077412           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  943.724041   191  4.94096356           R-squared     =  0.2916 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2657 
       Total |  1332.27823   198  6.72867793           Root MSE      =  2.2228 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .2584375    .033879     7.63   0.000                  .490592 
         phy |   13.18317   7.546656     1.75   0.082                 .2052182 
         eco |  -1.849253   1.869376    -0.99   0.324                -.0864994 
         soc |   -.311121    2.01175    -0.15   0.877                -.0106908 
     polity2 |  -.0187913   .0235595    -0.80   0.426                 -.054949 
weightedco~x |   .0000363   .0000142     2.55   0.012                  .161423 
     durable |   .0082781   .0093686     0.88   0.378                 .0785381 
       _cons |  -9.897326   6.502693    -1.52   0.130                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Epidemics 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if distype 
=="Epidemic", beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     166 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   158) =   17.04 
       Model |  275.548969     7  39.3641384           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  365.022727   158  2.31027043           R-squared     =  0.4302 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4049 
       Total |  640.571696   165   3.8822527           Root MSE      =    1.52 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .2422504   .0244992     9.89   0.000                  .622364 
         phy |  -4.959192   6.521027    -0.76   0.448                -.1016828 
         eco |   6.605481   4.738991     1.39   0.165                  .195848 
         soc |    .727275   .6131045     1.19   0.237                 .0758833 
     polity2 |  -.0858428   .0224189    -3.83   0.000                -.3059969 
weightedco~x |   .0000396   .0000148     2.67   0.008                 .1940033 
     durable |   .0072615   .0089644     0.81   0.419                 .0946248 
       _cons |     .95644   5.456389     0.18   0.861                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Floods 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if distype =="Flood", 
beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     584 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   576) =   29.66 
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       Model |  486.484636     7  69.4978052           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1349.61571   576  2.34308283           R-squared     =  0.2650 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2560 
       Total |  1836.10034   583  3.14940025           Root MSE      =  1.5307 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1450382   .0130416    11.12   0.000                 .4201336 
         phy |  -.8893481   2.389367    -0.37   0.710                -.0243595 
         eco |   2.358729   .9031395     2.61   0.009                 .1251968 
         soc |   .6233287   .3614666     1.72   0.085                 .0646681 
     polity2 |  -.0140054   .0097363    -1.44   0.151                -.0575445 
weightedco~x |   .0000309   6.72e-06     4.60   0.000                  .173707 
     durable |   .0012749   .0032583     0.39   0.696                 .0209013 
       _cons |   .2819307   2.062688     0.14   0.891                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Slides 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if distype =="Slide", 
beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      50 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,    42) =    1.64 
       Model |  18.7754503     7  2.68220719           Prob > F      =  0.1518 
    Residual |  68.8447862    42  1.63916158           R-squared     =  0.2143 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0833 
       Total |  87.6202366    49  1.78816809           Root MSE      =  1.2803 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .0920644    .040689     2.26   0.029                 .3632211 
         phy |   22.95916   12.44879     1.84   0.072                  .437523 
         eco |  -3.117946   4.255373    -0.73   0.468                 -.136311 
         soc |  -.7218026   1.881194    -0.38   0.703                -.0611231 
     polity2 |   .0362179   .0253718     1.43   0.161                 .2084462 
weightedco~x |  -2.64e-06   .0000201    -0.13   0.896                -.0205049 
     durable |   .0076336   .0093532     0.82   0.419                  .151946 
       _cons |  -15.93401   10.29382    -1.55   0.129                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Wind Storms 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if distype =="Wind 
storm", beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     431 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   423) =   26.55 
       Model |  437.026216     7  62.4323165           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  994.544834   423  2.35116982           R-squared     =  0.3053 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2938 
       Total |  1431.57105   430    3.329235           Root MSE      =  1.5334 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1305089   .0142241     9.18   0.000                 .3943103 
         phy |   9.819031   2.567942     3.82   0.000                  .336791 
         eco |  -.4103971   1.054932    -0.39   0.697                -.0241313 
         soc |   2.097846   .4443406     4.72   0.000                 .2003833 
     polity2 |  -.0111672   .0109158    -1.02   0.307                -.0460566 
weightedco~x |   .0000221   5.41e-06     4.08   0.000                 .1700231 
     durable |   .0108757   .0035999     3.02   0.003                 .2141004 
       _cons |  -7.632459   2.158746    -3.54   0.000                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Continent 
Disasters that occurred in Asian countries provided the best combination of F-score and R-squared.  For 
this sample, the physical and stability indicators are significant and in the expected direction.  The 
regression is not biased by collinearity of heteroskedastic.  However, omitted variable bias is present.  The 
sample of African nations produced the worst goodness of fit. 
 
 
 
 
Africa 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if cont =="Africa", 
beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     181 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   173) =    3.09 
       Model |  81.7980469     7  11.6854353           Prob > F      =  0.0043 
    Residual |  653.510772   173  3.77751891           R-squared     =  0.1112 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0753 
       Total |  735.308819   180  4.08504899           Root MSE      =  1.9436 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .0729899   .0268622     2.72   0.007                 .1996029 
         phy |  -22.61857   13.99765    -1.62   0.108                -.1387252 
         eco |   12.83455   13.08416     0.98   0.328                 .0888882 
         soc |  -5.301008   1.759295    -3.01   0.003                -.2637218 
     polity2 |  -.0222889   .0398271    -0.56   0.576                -.0543903 
weightedco~x |  -.0000335   .0000352    -0.95   0.343                -.0799709 
     durable |   .0103441   .0103951     1.00   0.321                 .0844766 
       _cons |   12.90554   16.33177     0.79   0.430                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     polity2 |      1.84    0.543893 
         eco |      1.60    0.625630 
         soc |      1.49    0.670632 
         phy |      1.43    0.697022 
     durable |      1.40    0.712837 
weightedco~x |      1.38    0.726790 
 log_aff2pop |      1.05    0.952019 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.46 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =      2.99 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.0840 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 170) =      2.61 
                  Prob > F =      0.0534 
 
Americas 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if cont =="Americas", 
beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     358 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   350) =   14.41 
       Model |  272.984514     7  38.9977877           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
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    Residual |  946.915686   350  2.70547339           R-squared     =  0.2238 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2083 
       Total |   1219.9002   357  3.41708739           Root MSE      =  1.6448 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1556483   .0181324     8.58   0.000                 .4316255 
         phy |   1.366236   3.393092     0.40   0.687                 .0576657 
         eco |   .0577975   2.344017     0.02   0.980                 .0028922 
         soc |  -2.720471   1.467669    -1.85   0.065                -.0884155 
     polity2 |  -.0235047   .0149478    -1.57   0.117                 -.084169 
weightedco~x |   .0000108   8.67e-06     1.25   0.213                 .0605929 
     durable |    .000765   .0045054     0.17   0.865                 .0205335 
       _cons |   .6092553   2.801426     0.22   0.828                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      9.25    0.108129 
     durable |      6.59    0.151662 
         eco |      6.20    0.161193 
     polity2 |      1.29    0.774054 
 log_aff2pop |      1.14    0.877164 
weightedco~x |      1.06    0.939245 
         soc |      1.03    0.974751 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      3.80 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =     14.61 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.0001 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 347) =      1.08 
                  Prob > F =      0.3562 
 
Asia 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if cont =="Asia", 
beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     800 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   792) =   32.29 
       Model |  653.354116     7  93.3363023           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2289.29414   792   2.8905229           R-squared     =  0.2220 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2152 
       Total |  2942.64825   799  3.68291396           Root MSE      =  1.7002 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1341186   .0104557    12.83   0.000                 .4126009 
         phy |   9.291852   2.779984     3.34   0.001                  .135144 
         eco |  -1.716705   1.205728    -1.42   0.155                -.0563495 
         soc |   .6429819   .3292784     1.95   0.051                 .0650655 
     polity2 |  -.0019942    .008978    -0.22   0.824                -.0075846 
weightedco~x |    .000023   4.87e-06     4.72   0.000                 .1550504 
     durable |   .0020294    .004105     0.49   0.621                 .0163284 
       _cons |  -5.125004   2.294139    -2.23   0.026                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
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    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      1.66    0.600847 
         eco |      1.59    0.627121 
     polity2 |      1.19    0.842449 
         soc |      1.13    0.884724 
     durable |      1.11    0.900444 
weightedco~x |      1.10    0.909514 
 log_aff2pop |      1.05    0.949403 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.26 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =      0.01 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.9228 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 789) =      7.35 
                  Prob > F =      0.0001 
 
Europe 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if cont =="Europe", 
beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     110 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   102) =    4.41 
       Model |   103.47486     7  14.7821229           Prob > F      =  0.0003 
    Residual |  341.671895   102  3.34972446           R-squared     =  0.2325 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1798 
       Total |  445.146755   109  4.08391518           Root MSE      =  1.8302 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1073617   .0359489     2.99   0.004                 .2925556 
         phy |   17.68197   9.855514     1.79   0.076                 .3709994 
         eco |   1.174608   1.348536     0.87   0.386                  .128594 
         soc |   3.243222   2.968532     1.09   0.277                 .1293429 
     polity2 |   .0430836   .0350904     1.23   0.222                 .1218879 
weightedco~x |   .0000163   .0000241     0.68   0.499                 .0610499 
     durable |    .013556   .0096015     1.41   0.161                 .1723402 
       _cons |  -16.30611   8.734548    -1.87   0.065                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      5.68    0.175979 
         eco |      2.90    0.345243 
     durable |      1.98    0.505031 
         soc |      1.86    0.536896 
     polity2 |      1.31    0.763542 
 log_aff2pop |      1.28    0.784182 
weightedco~x |      1.08    0.928436 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.30 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =      7.62 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.0058 
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. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 99) =      2.31 
                  Prob > F =      0.0814 
 
Oceania 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if cont =="Oceania", 
beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      44 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,    36) =    4.22 
       Model |  42.4069719     7  6.05813885           Prob > F      =  0.0017 
    Residual |  51.6866629    36  1.43574064           R-squared     =  0.4507 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3439 
       Total |  94.0936348    43  2.18822407           Root MSE      =  1.1982 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .0328782   .0418487     0.79   0.437                 .1177744 
         phy |  -16.81395   7.992016    -2.10   0.042                -.7117428 
         eco |   10.32481    2.90583     3.55   0.001                 1.067455 
         soc |   -22.7231   19.61556    -1.16   0.254                -.2623685 
     polity2 |   .3452976   .1471061     2.35   0.025                 .5087383 
weightedco~x |   .0002733   .0001492     1.83   0.075                 .3323711 
     durable |  -.0108622   .0121732    -0.89   0.378                -.3019758 
       _cons |   5.177203   6.175877     0.84   0.407                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     durable |      7.51    0.133229 
         phy |      7.50    0.133320 
         eco |      5.92    0.169060 
         soc |      3.36    0.297458 
     polity2 |      3.08    0.324827 
weightedco~x |      2.16    0.463429 
 log_aff2pop |      1.47    0.678994 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      4.43 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 33) =      0.64 
                  Prob > F =      0.5939 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =      0.64 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.4250 
 
 
 
Time Period 
The model fits best the decades 1970-80 and 1980-90.  In both samples, the conflict index is significant and 
in the expected direction.  While the polity index is significant and in the predicted direction for the most 
recent decade, the durability index is significant and in the expected direction for the latter decade.  
Interestingly, the most recent disasters are not well explained by the model.     
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1990-Pres. 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if year > 1990, beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     413 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   405) =   11.81 
       Model |  266.945474     7  38.1350678           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1308.12998   405  3.22995058           R-squared     =  0.1695 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1551 
       Total |  1575.07546   412  3.82299868           Root MSE      =  1.7972 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .0976335     .01677     5.82   0.000                 .2747925 
         phy |   6.191878    3.18819     1.94   0.053                 .2030868 
         eco |   .8195003   .7963518     1.03   0.304                 .0700218 
         soc |   1.006756   .4581032     2.20   0.029                 .1061671 
     polity2 |  -.0097119   .0152416    -0.64   0.524                -.0334285 
weightedco~x |   5.86e-06   .0000126     0.47   0.642                  .021786 
     durable |   .0051691    .004222     1.22   0.222                 .0996078 
       _cons |   -4.49964   2.770019    -1.62   0.105                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      5.33    0.187537 
     durable |      3.23    0.309816 
         eco |      2.26    0.442911 
     polity2 |      1.34    0.745089 
         soc |      1.14    0.878691 
 log_aff2pop |      1.09    0.920482 
weightedco~x |      1.07    0.936731 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.21 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =      2.71 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.0998 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 402) =      2.07 
                  Prob > F =      0.1033 
 
1980-90 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if year > 1980 & year 
< 1990, beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     501 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   493) =   22.76 
       Model |  426.327737     7  60.9039624           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1319.39577   493  2.67625917           R-squared     =  0.2442 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2335 
       Total |  1745.72351   500  3.49144702           Root MSE      =  1.6359 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1111908   .0133728     8.31   0.000                 .3406788 
         phy |   5.416855     2.9808     1.82   0.070                  .133223 
         eco |   2.725426    2.09329     1.30   0.194                 .0901505 
         soc |   1.006282   .4304755     2.34   0.020                 .0953298 
     polity2 |  -.0332161   .0116067    -2.86   0.004                -.1284194 
weightedco~x |   .0000172   5.70e-06     3.02   0.003                 .1271661 
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     durable |   .0073035   .0037466     1.95   0.052                 .1063702 
       _cons |  -5.680817   2.342041    -2.43   0.016                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      3.51    0.285248 
         eco |      3.13    0.319761 
     durable |      1.94    0.514886 
     polity2 |      1.31    0.761332 
weightedco~x |      1.15    0.867285 
 log_aff2pop |      1.10    0.913183 
         soc |      1.08    0.921802 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.89 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =      0.29 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.5934 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 490) =      3.11 
                  Prob > F =      0.0260 
 
1970-80 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if year > 1970 & year 
< 1980, beta  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     267 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   259) =   12.99 
       Model |   305.33711     7  43.6195872           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  869.371234   259  3.35664569           R-squared     =  0.2599 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2399 
       Total |  1174.70834   266  4.41619678           Root MSE      =  1.8321 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1606146   .0201217     7.98   0.000                 .4493783 
         phy |   11.54212   5.495526     2.10   0.037                  .251235 
         eco |    2.81279   5.272634     0.53   0.594                 .0433882 
         soc |   .0932851   .8477804     0.11   0.912                 .0062144 
     polity2 |     .00533   .0180138     0.30   0.768                 .0189595 
weightedco~x |   .0000427   .0000117     3.66   0.000                 .2048202 
     durable |   .0173022   .0078417     2.21   0.028                 .2188581 
       _cons |  -12.28579   5.107716    -2.41   0.017                        . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      5.01    0.199695 
     durable |      3.44    0.290426 
         eco |      2.31    0.431968 
     polity2 |      1.44    0.695935 
         soc |      1.12    0.895860 
 log_aff2pop |      1.11    0.901553 
weightedco~x |      1.10    0.910139 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.22 
 
. hettest 
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Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =     11.54 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.0007 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 256) =      3.38 
                  Prob > F =      0.0189 
 
Previous to 1970 
.  regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity2 weighted durable if year < 1970  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   182) =    6.17 
       Model |  153.783274     7  21.9690391           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  647.688301   182  3.55872693           R-squared     =  0.1919 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1608 
       Total |  801.471575   189  4.24059035           Root MSE      =  1.8865 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1289896   .0260282     4.96   0.000     .0776338    .1803454 
         phy |  -1.936266   11.38137    -0.17   0.865    -24.39266    20.52013 
         eco |    10.7227   36.18578     0.30   0.767    -60.67488    82.12028 
         soc |    3.19274     1.5407     2.07   0.040     .1528088    6.232672 
     polity2 |  -.0264744   .0217087    -1.22   0.224    -.0693076    .0163588 
weightedco~x |   .0000231   .0000113     2.06   0.041     9.33e-07    .0000454 
     durable |  -.0111484   .0105761    -1.05   0.293    -.0320159    .0097192 
       _cons |  -6.106576   29.27587    -0.21   0.835    -63.87032    51.65717 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         eco |      4.66    0.214365 
         phy |      4.25    0.235514 
     durable |      2.56    0.389873 
     polity2 |      1.45    0.691788 
         soc |      1.36    0.736832 
weightedco~x |      1.23    0.810632 
 log_aff2pop |      1.10    0.908133 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.37 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 179) =      0.51 
                  Prob > F =      0.6793 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =      1.27 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.2600 
 
 
Asian during 1970-90 versus 1970-pres: A hint regarding the missing variable 
Noteworthy, a sample of Asian disasters between 1970 and 1990 produced results consistent with the large 
sample but not limited by econometric findings.    
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Indeed, comparing two samples based on Asian countries indicates a direction for further research to 
improve the model.  While the sample that includes the time period 1970-90 does not possess colinearity, 
heteroskedasticity, or omitted variable bias, the sample that ranges from 1970 to present does possess 
omitted variable bias.  This finding indicates that a variable(s) that did not matter much before 1990 has 
changed at that point and matter for the model.  Such a variable, once identified, will likely improve the 
diagnostics for the larger sample. 
 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity durable weighted if cont =="Asia" & year 
> 1970 & year < 1990 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     444 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   436) =   25.02 
       Model |  445.448197     7  63.6354568           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1109.03615   436  2.54366089           R-squared     =  0.2866 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2751 
       Total |  1554.48435   443  3.50899401           Root MSE      =  1.5949 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1424005   .0128238    11.10   0.000     .1171963    .1676047 
         phy |   6.328518   4.240908     1.49   0.136    -2.006647    14.66368 
         eco |   3.002253   3.644933     0.82   0.411    -4.161571    10.16608 
         soc |   .8377212   .4493452     1.86   0.063    -.0454308    1.720873 
     polity2 |  -.0026443   .0127338    -0.21   0.836    -.0276715     .022383 
     durable |   .0113605   .0057595     1.97   0.049     .0000407    .0226804 
weightedco~x |   .0000174   5.55e-06     3.14   0.002     6.49e-06    .0000283 
       _cons |  -7.069094   3.197246    -2.21   0.028    -13.35303   -.7851631 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      2.06    0.484604 
         eco |      2.05    0.487817 
     polity2 |      1.36    0.734792 
weightedco~x |      1.21    0.823590 
     durable |      1.17    0.856125 
         soc |      1.13    0.886465 
 log_aff2pop |      1.06    0.944559 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.43 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =      0.10 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.7512 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 433) =      1.75 
                  Prob > F =      0.1560 
 
 
 
. regress log_kil log_aff2pop phy eco soc polity durable weighted if cont =="Asia" & year 
> 1970  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     702 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   694) =   32.77 
       Model |  630.732781     7  90.1046829           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1908.07358   694  2.74938556           R-squared     =  0.2484 
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-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2409 
       Total |  2538.80636   701  3.62169239           Root MSE      =  1.6581 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     log_kil |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 log_aff2pop |   .1378325   .0108877    12.66   0.000     .1164557    .1592093 
         phy |   9.638273   2.787205     3.46   0.001     4.165909    15.11064 
         eco |  -2.014285   1.190855    -1.69   0.091    -4.352395    .3238259 
         soc |   .8841544   .3334102     2.65   0.008     .2295409    1.538768 
     polity2 |  -.0024627   .0096089    -0.26   0.798    -.0213288    .0164034 
     durable |   .0068323   .0041284     1.65   0.098    -.0012733    .0149378 
weightedco~x |   .0000239   4.95e-06     4.84   0.000     .0000142    .0000336 
       _cons |  -5.462409   2.292306    -2.38   0.017    -9.963096   -.9617219 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         phy |      1.65    0.604893 
         eco |      1.62    0.617251 
     polity2 |      1.22    0.819047 
         soc |      1.15    0.871850 
     durable |      1.11    0.897601 
weightedco~x |      1.11    0.902193 
 log_aff2pop |      1.05    0.947879 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.27 
 
. hettest 
 
Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of log_kil 
     Ho: Constant variance 
         chi2(1)      =      0.02 
         Prob > chi2  =      0.8934 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of log_kil 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 691) =      6.24 
                  Prob > F =      0.0003 
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Appendix D:  Using the regressions results to predict disaster impact. 
 Predicting the impact of a natural disaster is one potential application of research on the statistical 
determinants of natural disasters.  The information obtained from these calculations will help disaster relief 
planners and field workers estimate magnitude of the task before them, and, as such, plan accordingly.  
Naturally, the utility of this information is limited by precision and accuracy of the data and the analysis.  
The predictions below are based on preliminary calculations and are presented as examples of possible 
applications of the regression analysis. 
 
Example 1:  Hurricane Isabelle impacts the United States. 
During the writing of this thesis, a major hurricane impacted of east coast of the United States.  Previous to 
the landfall of this disaster the news channels reported that an estimated 1 million people will be affected 
by this natural disaster.  Using this estimate of the people affected and the known values of the other 
indicators, we can estimate the expected number of people killed by the disaster.  Note that limitations of 
the dataset meant that current values of population and each of the indexes was extrapolated from the 
available data. 
 
Using the Clarify software (described at the end of Chapter 3), the model predicts that between 25 and 74 
people were killed during this disaster: 
. simqi, tfunc(exp) listx 
 
You have set the following values for the explanatory variables: 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 Variable |         Value              Description     
----------+------------------------------------------- 
      eco |             .5429622        .5429622       
 log~2pop |             15.06874  log(1000000^2/285581 
      phy |             .6928783        .6928783       
      pol |                 .001          0.001        
      soc |             .0326193        .0326193       
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Quantities of interest based on those explanatory values: 
 
      Quantity of Interest |     Mean       Std. Err.    [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
           E[exp(log_kil)] |   43.60254      13.6238     24.55021    73.73593  
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